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Abstract
We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice
to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract
traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in
states where collateral value is high and maximizes borrowing capacity when it is
low. Haircuts increase both with counterparty risk and asset risk. In equilibrium,
lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and
generates a “collateral multiplier” effect. Finally, we show that intermediation by
dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders.
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1 Introduction
Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue that the financial panic of 2007-08 started with a
run on the market for repurchase agreements (repos). Lenders drastically increased the
haircut requested for some types of collateral, or stopped lending altogether. This view
was very influential in shaping our understanding of the crisis.1 Calls for regulation
quickly followed.2 The mere possibility that a run on repos could lead to a financial
market meltdown speaks to their importance for money markets. Overall, repo market
activity is enormous. Recent surveys estimate outstanding volumes at €5.4 trillion in
Europe while calculations vary from $3.8 trillion to $5.5 trillion for the U.S.3 Repos are
simple financial instruments used to lend cash against collateral. Repos allow borrowers
to carry out leveraged purchases of assets, which are pledged as collateral to obtain
cash, or to borrow securities. The main users of repos are large dealer banks and other
financial institutions such as money market funds and hedge funds. For these reasons,
repo markets have important implications for market liquidity, as Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) illustrate. Dealer banks also play a major role as repo intermediaries
between cash providers and cash borrowers. Finally, most major central banks implement
monetary policy using repos, thus contributing to the size and liquidity of these markets.
Technically, a repo contract is the sale of an asset combined with a forward contract
that requires the borrower to repurchase the asset from the lender at a future date for a
pre-specified (repurchase) price. The lender requires a haircut defined as the difference
between the selling price in a repo and the asset’s spot market price. Besides the haircut,
a repo differs from a sale of an asset followed by a re-purchase of the same asset in the
spot market at a later date because the repo price is pre-specified. While a repo looks
very much like a simple collateralized loan, it has two additional and important features.
It is a recourse loan and the borrower sells the collateral rather than merely pledging it.4
1Subsequent studies by Krishnamurty, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) and Copeland, Martin, and Walker
(2014) have qualified this finding by showing that the run was specific to the large bilateral segment of
the repo market.
2See for example Acharya and Öncü (2013) and FRBNY (2010).
3The number for Europe is from the International Capital Market Association (ICMA, 2016). The two
figures for the US are from Copeland, Davis, LeSueur, and Martin (2014) and Copeland, Davis, LeSueur,
and Martin (2012) where the latter adds reverse repo. These numbers are only estimates because many
repo contracts are traded over the counter and thus difficult to account for.
4The General Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA, 2011) used mostly by US dealers and the
Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA, 1996) used for non-US repos lay out the provisions related to a
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The lender thus acquires the legal title to the asset sold and so the possibility to re-use
the collateral before the forward contract with the borrower matures.
Repos, as well as the practice to re-use the collateral, known as re-use or re-hypothecation,
have attracted a lot of attention from economists and regulators alike.5 However, a proper
understanding of the motivation of traders to enter repos and of the implications of col-
lateral re-use is still needed. We propose a theory of repos that accounts for the basic
features of these contracts to answer the following questions. Why are repos used over
spot sales of the asset? How does collateral re-use impact leverage in the economy? Fi-
nally, why are repos intermediated, i.e. why do borrowers trade through dealer banks
rather than directly with lenders and how do dealer banks fund their operations? Our
model thus provides a basis to understand repos’ potential contribution to systemic risk.
In this paper we analyze a simple competitive economy where some investors have
funding needs, but are unable to commit to future payments. To satisfy their needs,
they can use the assets they own, by either selling them in the spot market or in repo
sales. Repo sales are characterized as loan contracts exhibiting the key features of repos
described above. We show that in equilibrium investors prefer to trade repos rather than
default event. In what follows, we briefly outline the recourse features of repo transactions, as summarized
by ICMA (2013), the leading trade association for repos. After determining the market value of the
collateral, all repo exposures between the two counterparties are netted off. Then, “whoever owes the
residual sum must pay it by the next business day. Either party can be charged interest on late payment.”
Hence, the lender has recourse to the balance sheet of the borrower since he can claim any payment
due in excess of the market value of the collateral. We embed this recourse loan feature in our model in
Section 2. Appendix A provides more details about the default provisions in master agreements for repos
and the full documents for these agreements can be found at http://www.sifma.org/services/standard-
forms-and-documentation/mra,-gmra,-msla-and-msftas/
5Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that securities are characterized by cash-flow rights but also control
rights. Collateralized loans grant neither cash-flow rights nor control rights over the collateral to the
lender unless the counterparties sign an agreement for this purpose. As a sale of the asset, a repo
automatically gives the lender full control rights over the security as well as over its cash-flows. Re-use
rights follow directly from ownership rights. As Comotto (2014) explains, there is a subtle difference
between US and EU law however. Under EU law, a repo is a transfer of the security’s title to the lender.
However, a repo in the US falls under New York law which is the predominant jurisdiction in the US.
“Under the law of New York, the transfer of title to collateral is not legally robust. In the event of a
repo seller becoming insolvent, there is a material risk that the rights of the buyer to liquidate collateral
could be successfully challenged in court. Consequently, the transfer of collateral in the US takes the
form of the seller giving the buyer (1) a pledge, in which the collateral is transferred into the control of
the buyer or his investor, and (2) the right to re-use the collateral at any time during the term of the
repo, in other words, a right of re-hypothecation. The right of re-use of the pledged collateral (...) gives
US repo the same legal effect as a transfer of title of collateral.” To conclude, although there are legal
differences between re-use and rehypothecation, they are economically equivalent (see e.g. Singh, 2011)
and we treat them as such in our analysis.
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spot. Furthermore, in equilibrium investors exercise the option to re-use collateral. This
expands the borrowing capacity of investors in the economy through a multiplier effect.
Collateral re-use also affects the structure of the repo market: intermediation by safer
counterparties, who use repos to fund their purchase of assets, may endogenously arise.
The model features two types of risk averse investors, cash poor investors (natural
borrowers) and cash rich investors (natural lenders). Borrowers own an asset, whose
future payoff is uncertain. A large variety of possible repo contracts, characterized by
different values of the repurchase price, are available for trade. Due to borrowers’ inability
to commit, they may choose to default on these contracts. The punishment for default
is the loss of the asset sold in the repo together with a penalty reflecting the recourse
nature of repos and which varies with the borrower’s creditworthiness. Hence there is
a maximal amount that borrowers can credibly promise to repay, that depends on the
future market value of the asset. The recourse nature of repo contracts implies that this
maximal amount may exceed the future spot market price of the asset. This amount and
the quantity of the asset held by investors determines then their borrowing capacity with
a repo sale.
Lenders can re-use the collateral they acquired via repos, e.g. by selling it in the
spot market. By returning collateral to the market, re-use allows borrowers to purchase
more assets to pledge them again in repo sales to lenders. We find that allowing re-use,
through the iteration of these transactions, generates a collateral multiplier effect, thus
augmenting the borrowing capacity of borrowers. Hence, the benefits of re-use materialize
when the asset is scarce.
We then characterize the repurchase price of the repo contract that investors choose
to trade in equilibrium. Risk-averse investors value the ability to borrow but dislike
fluctuations in the future asset price. Hence, two motives – a hedging and a borrowing
motive – determine the equilibrium repurchase price. In the states where the market
value of the asset is low, the ability to borrow is limited. There, the borrowing motive
prevails and the repurchase price equals the maximal amount that borrowers can promise
to repay. In the other states, where the asset price is high, their borrowing capacity
is also high. Hence investors are not constrained and the hedging motive implies that
the repurchase price is set at a level that ensures a constant level of consumption. In
the absence of re-use, the repurchase price would thus be set at a constant level. When
lenders re-use collateral they effectively sell the asset short in the spot market, and are
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thus exposed to asset price risk: we show that the equilibrium repurchase price also
offsets this price exposure of lenders. These hedging and borrowing motives explain why
investors prefer repo contracts over spot trades.
We derive comparative statics properties for equilibrium haircuts and liquidity pre-
mia. Haircuts increase when collateral is more abundant or when counterparty quality
decreases, because riskier borrowers can credibly promise to repay lower amounts. We
also show that riskier assets command higher haircuts and lower liquidity premia, since
higher risk entails a worse distribution of collateral value across states relative to collateral
needs. The effect of collateral re-use on haircuts and liquidity premia is ambiguous. On
the one hand, re-use increases the amount of the asset that can be pledged as collateral
and hence relaxes the borrowing constraint. This tends to decrease the liquidity pre-
mium and to increase the haircut. However, the fact that the asset can be re-used when
pledged as collateral makes each unit of the asset more valuable. This tends to increase
the liquidity premium. Collateral re-use also modifies the properties of the equilibrium
repo contract, increasing the repurchase price, thereby lowering the haircut. These coun-
teracting effects of re-use on the equilibrium spot price and repo price also explain why
its overall impact on leverage is ambiguous.
In addition, our paper sheds light on the way in which dealer banks use repos to lever
up and fund their activities. Dealers’ leverage is closely related to their role in channeling
funds between different investors. Dealer banks obtain funds to purchase assets by using
these assets as collateral in repos. As a result, they only need to tap into their cash
holdings to pay the repo haircut. Since haircuts are usually small, dealer banks can be
highly levered. So using repos, dealers can intermediate between cash poor investors, e.g.
hedge funds, and cash rich investors, e.g. insurance companies, or money market funds.
As a result, dealer banks make for a significant share of the repo market.
To account for these trading patterns, we extend the model by introducing a third
type of investors, to whom we refer as dealers. Dealers have limited cash and no asset, but
a higher counterparty quality. We show that in this environment, under some conditions
we identify, dealers emerge in equilibrium as intermediaries between natural borrowers
and natural lenders. Even though they could trade directly, natural borrowers (say,
hedge funds) prefer to sell the asset in the spot market to dealers. Dealers in turn
pledge it as collateral in a repo with natural lenders (say, insurance companies) to obtain
the funds necessary to purchase the asset. The emergence of dealer banks as leveraged
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intermediaries hinges on their superior counterparty quality.
Finally, we show that with collateral re-use intermediation may also occur via a chain
of repo trades. In a repo chain, a natural borrower enters a repo with a dealer bank who
in turn enters another repo with the natural lender. Intermediation via a chain of repos
can arise when the dealer bank has both a higher counterparty quality than the natural
borrower and is better able at re-deploying collateral than the natural lender. Then,
through re-use, one unit pledged to the dealer bank can indeed support more borrowing
in the chain of transactions. This explains why a natural borrower chooses to trade with
dealers even when there are larger gains from trade with natural lenders.
Relation to the literature
Recent theoretical works highlighted some features of repo contracts as sources of
funding fragility. As a short-term debt instrument to finance long-term assets, Zhang
(2014) and Martin, Skeie, and Thadden (2014) show that repos are subject to roll-over
risk. Antinolfi, Carapella, Kahn, Martin, Mills, and Nosal (2015) show that the benefit of
an exemption from automatic stay6 granted to repos may be harmful for social welfare in
the presence of fire sales, a point also made by Infante (2013) and Kuong (2016). These
papers usually take the trade of repurchase agreements and their specific features as given
while we want to understand their emergence as a funding instrument.
One natural question is why borrowers do not simply sell the collateral to lenders? A
first strand of papers explains the existence of repos using transaction costs (e.g. Duffie,
1996) or search frictions (e.g. Narajabad and Monnet, 2012, Tomura, 2016, and Parlatore,
2018). Bundling the sale and the repurchase of the asset in one transaction lowers search
costs or mitigates bargaining inefficiencies. Bigio (2015) and Madison (2016) emphasize
the role of informational asymmetries regarding the quality of the asset to explain repos:
their collateralized debt features reduce adverse selection between the informed seller and
the uninformed buyer as in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) or Hendel and Lizzeri (2002). We
show that investors choose to trade repos in an environment with symmetric information,
where markets are Walrasian, but where collateral has uncertain payoff. One limitation
of the works mentioned above is that the borrower chooses to sell repo if he can obtain
more cash than in a spot sale of the asset, that is if the haircut is negative. Our analysis
rationalizes the use of repos with positive haircuts when investors are risk-averse. In
6As shown by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) for leases, such benefit is in terms of easier repossession
of collateral in a default event.
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addition, we account for the possible re-use of collateral in repos by showing its benefits.
To derive the equilibrium repo contract, we follow the competitive approach of Geanako-
plos (1996), Araújo, Orrillo, and Páscoa (2000), and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) where
the properties of the collateralized promises traded by investors are selected in equilib-
rium. Unlike these papers where the only cost of default is the loss of the collateral,
our model aims to capture the recourse nature of repo transactions. We thus allow
for additional penalties for default, some of them non-pecuniary in the spirit of Dubey,
Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). While our results on the characterization of repo con-
tracts traded in equilibrium remain valid also in the absence of these additional penalties,
the recourse nature of repos is crucial to explain re-use. Indeed, Maurin (2017) showed
in a more general environment that the collateral multiplier effect disappears when loans
are non-recourse.
Collateral re-use is discussed by Singh and Aitken (2010) and Singh (2011), who claim
that it lubricates transactions in the financial system.7 At the same time, re-use generates
the risk that the lender, who receives the collateral, does not or cannot return it when
due, as explained by Monnet (2011). Unlike Bottazzi, Luque, and Páscoa (2012) or
Andolfatto, Martin, and Zhang (2017), we account for the double commitment problem
induced by re-use. The increase in the circulation of collateral obtained with re-use also
arises with pyramiding (see Gottardi and Kubler, 2015), where collateralized debt claims
are themselves used as collateral. However, the mechanism is different: in pyramiding,
no two sided commitment problem arises and the recourse nature of loans also plays no
role. We stress the role of collateral re-use in explaining the presence of intermediation
in the repo market, as in Infante (2015) and Muley (2016). Unlike in these papers, in
our analysis intermediation arises endogenously since direct trade between borrowers and
lenders is possible.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the model and the set of contracts
available for trade in Section 2. We characterize the equilibrium and the properties of
repo contracts traded in Section 3, where we also derive the properties of haircuts and
liquidity premia. Section 4 shows that intermediation arises in equilibrium. Finally,
Section 5 establishes the robustness of our findings to alternative specifications of the
repurchase price and Section 6 concludes. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
7Fuhrer, Guggenheim, and Schumacher (2016) estimate an average 10% re-use rate in the Swiss repo
market over 2006-2013.
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2 The Model
In this section we present a simple environment where risk averse investors have funding
needs. To accommodate these needs, they can sell an asset in positive net supply and
take short positions in a variety of securities in zero net supply. These trades occur
in a competitive financial market. Short positions are subject to limited commitment
and require collateral. Trade in these securities captures the main ingredients of repo
contracts.
2.1 Setting
The economy lasts three periods, t = 1, 2, 3. There is a unit mass of investors of each
type i = 1, 2 and one consumption good each period. For simplification, we will refer to
all investors of type i as “investors i.” All investors have endowment ω in the first two
periods and zero in the last one. Investor 1 is also endowed with a units of an asset while
investor 2 has none.8 Each unit of the asset pays dividend s in period 3. The dividend is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(.) with support S = [s, s̄]
and mean E[s] = 1. The realization of s becomes known to all investors in period 2, one
period before the dividend is paid. As a consequence, price risk arises in period 2.
Let cit denote investor i’s consumption in period t. Investors have preferences over con-
sumption profiles ci = (ci1, c
i
2, c
i
3) described by the following utility functions, respectively
for i = 1, 2 :
U1(c1) = c11 + v(c
1
2) + c
1
3
U2(c2) = c21 + u(c
2
2) + βc
2
3
where β < 1, u(.) and v(.) are respectively strictly and weakly concave functions. We
assume u′(ω) > v′(ω) and u′(2ω) < v′(0).9 The main role of this specification is to capture
the fact that investor 1 wants to borrow short-term in period 1. He wants to borrow
because his intertemporal rate of substitution between periods 1 and 2 is lower than that
of investor 2. His borrowing should be short-term because investor 2 discounts period 3
8This is for simplicity only and we could easily relax this assumption, as none of the results depend
on it.
9Observe that a special case of the preferences as specified above is v(.) = δu(.), where investors only
differ with respect to their discount factor.
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cash flow more than investor 1 (β < 1). In addition, the concavity of the investors’ utility
over date 2 consumption implies that they dislike variability in repayment terms in period
2. We simplify the analysis by assuming that their utility is linear over consumption at
the other dates, but linearity plays no essential role in our results.
2.2 Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
To illustrate the basic features of this economy, it is useful to consider its Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium allocation (c1∗, c
2
∗). Consumption at date 2 is determined by equating the
investors’ marginal rates of substitution between period 1 and period 2 while investor 2
does not consume in the last period:10⎧⎨⎩u′(c22,∗) = v′(2ω − c22,∗)c23,∗ = 0 (1)
where we used the resource constraint in period 2 to substitute for c12,∗ = 2ω − c22,∗.
The prices for period 2 and 3 consumption are respectively u′(c22,∗) and 1, with period
1 consumption as the numeraire. Consumption in period 1 is then obtained from the
budget constraints. Thus for investor 2 we have c21,∗ = ω − u′(c22,∗)(c22,∗ − ω) and we will
assume that
ω ≥ u′(c22,∗)(c22,∗ − ω) (2)
in the remainder of the text.
In the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, investor 1 borrows u′(c22,∗)(c
2
2,∗ − ω) from investors
2 in period 1 and repays with a net interest rate r∗ = 1/u′(c22,∗) − 1 in period 2. In the
following we refer for simplicity to this equilibrium allocation as the first best allocation.
Observe that consumption in period 2 (c12,∗, c
2
2,∗) is deterministic even though the asset
payoff s is already known. Indeed, risk averse investors prefer a smooth consumption
profile.
10Intuitively, since β < 1 investor 2 has a lower marginal utility for period 3 consumption utility than
investor 1.
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2.3 Financial Markets With Limited Commitment
We assume investors can buy or sell the asset each period in the spot market. They can
also take long and short positions in financial securities in the initial period 1, before
the uncertainty is realized. Unlike in the Arrow-Debreu framework, agents are unable to
fully commit to future promised payments. As we will see, this implies that borrowing
positions must be collateralized and the first best allocation cannot always be sustained.
Spot Trades
Let p1 and p2(s) denote the period 1 and period 2 spot market price of the asset
when the realized payoff is s. We let ai1 (resp. a
i
2(s)) be the asset holdings of investor
i after trading in period 1 (resp. period 2 and state s). Note that spot trades could be
a way for investor 1 to meet his borrowing needs: he could sell the asset in period 1 to
carry only a11 < a into period 2 and then buy it back in period 2 to carry a
1
2(s) > a
1
1
into period 3. However, a combination of spot trades alone can never sustain the first
best allocation. Indeed, since p2(s) is a function of the state s, such trades generate
undesirable consumption variability in period 2 for both investors.11
Repos
In period 1 investors can also trade promises to deliver the consumption good in period
2. We specify these financial securities so as to capture several features of repo contracts,
and we will refer to these securities as repos. There are in particular three features of
repo contracts we want to match. First, a repo agreement is a sale of an asset combined
with a forward repurchase of that asset. The repurchase price is effectively the amount to
be repaid by the seller and the asset plays a role as collateral. We thus model securities
as collateralized loans. Second, in a repo agreement the lender acquires ownership of the
asset and can sell or re-pledge the asset before the repo matures. We then also assume
that the collateral backing the security is transferred to the lender who enjoys a right
to re-use it. Finally, repos are recourse loans and the non-defaulting counterparty can
claim the payment of any remaining shortfall and other expenses. In our environment,
default on the securities entails additional costs beyond the loss of the asset pledged as
collateral. We now describe in details how we model each of these features.
(i) Collateralized loans - We let f = {f(s)}s∈S denote the payoff schedule for a
generic security. An investor selling security f promises to repay f(s) in state s of period
11See Online Appendix D.1 for a complete analysis of equilibrium with only spot trades.
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2 per unit of security sold. We allow for all possible values of f so that the market for
financial securities is complete. As we show below, the investors’ inability to commit
implies that short positions must be backed by the asset as collateral. Without loss of
generality, we set the collateral requirement to one unit of asset per unit of security sold.
We refer to the payoff schedule {f(s)}s∈S as the repurchase price, which can be state
contingent. Repos usually specify a constant repayment but margin calls or repricing
of the terms of trade during the lifetime of a repo are ways in which contingencies can
arise.12 In Section 5 we discuss the implementation of our equilibrium contract using
repos with fixed repurchase price.
(ii) Ownership transfer - The asset used as collateral is a financial claim. The
borrower transfers to the lender both the asset used as collateral and the ownership title
to this asset. The lender can then re-use this asset.13 Specifically, we assume that investor
i can re-use a fraction νi of the collateral he receives, where νi ∈ [0, 1]. We interpret νi as
a measure of the operational efficiency of a trader in re-deploying collateral for his own
trades.14
(iii) Recourse loans - In a collateralized loan with re-use there is a double commit-
ment problem. The borrower can fail to pay back the lender, but the lender can also fail
to return the collateral. In the following, we describe the punishment faced by investors
when they default on their obligation. Besides the loss of the collateral pledged or of the
right to receive the repayment due, the defaulting party incurs additional costs since the
other party can claim compensation. This captures the recourse nature of repo transac-
tions. We start by specifying the penalty for borrowers and then move on to the case of
lenders default.
Borrower Default
When the borrower defaults, the lender can retain or liquidate the collateral. In
practice, the lender typically needs to sell the asset at a discount below its fair market
12When a trader faces a margin call, he must pledge more collateral to sustain the same level of
borrowing. This is equivalent to reducing the amount borrowed per unit of asset pledged.
13This distinguishes the situation under consideration from that, for instance, of a mortgage loan where
the asset used as collateral is a physical asset and the borrower retains ownership of the collateral
14Singh (2011) discusses the role played by collateral desks at large dealer banks in channeling these
assets across different business lines. These desks might not be available for less sophisticated repo
market participants such as money market mutual funds or pension funds. In Appendix B, we discuss a
variant of our model where νj is the probability that lender j can access the market to re-use collateral
and provide conditions under which our results are robust to this alternative specification.
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value, and we model the cost of liquidation as a linear function of the market value of the
collateral, that is κp2(s) per unit of asset, for some κ ≥ 0. Then, the lender can claim the
shortfall he faces in a default, equal to the difference (when positive) between the payment
due, f(s) and the market value of the collateral, p2(s), net of the costs associated with
the liquidation of the collateral. This is in line with the recourse loan feature of repos and
the provisions in the event of default described in standard Repo Master Agreements.15
We assume that the lender is only able to collect a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of this shortfall
from the borrower. This partial recovery rate captures various frictions in recouping
payments from unsecured claims.16 We also posit that upon default, an investor i incurs
an additional, non-pecuniary cost, equal to a fraction πi ∈ [0, 1] of the shortfall, measured
in consumption units. This non-pecuniary component proxies for legal and reputation
costs. It may thus depend on the borrower’s type and increases in the size of the default.
To analyze the borrower’s incentives to default, consider a trade of one unit17 of repo
contract f between borrower i and lender j. Borrower i prefers to repay rather than
default in state s if and only if
f(s) ≤ p2(s) + (α + πi)max {f(s)− p2(s)(1− κ), 0} (3)
The borrower will repay whenever the repurchase price f(s) does not exceed the total
default cost, given by the expression on the right hand side of (3). The first term in that
expression is the market value p2(s) of the collateral seized by the lender. The second
term collects the fraction α of the shortfall recovered by the lender and the non-pecuniary
cost πi max {f(s)− p2(s)(1− κ), 0} for the borrower. We see from equation (3) that a
borrower may only choose to default if f(s) ≥ p2(s). Hence (3) can be written as follows:
f(s) ≤ 1− (α + πi)(1− κ)
1− α− πi p2(s) (4)
15See footnote 4 for a discussion of the recourse features of repo transactions and Appendix A for
a detailed summary of the master agreements’ provisions in an event of default. According to ICMA
(2013) the lender can include “transactions costs and professional expenses” when computing the shortfall
between the promised payoff and the actual payoff. The losses from the liquidation of the collateral for
the lender aim to capture these transactions costs.
16For instance, it might take time for the borrower to make these payments. In addition, such claims
have a junior status if the borrower files for bankruptcy.
17This is without loss of generality since penalties for default are linear in the amount traded, hence
incentives to default do not depend on the size of a position.
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Lender’s Default
We now discuss the punishment faced by a lender (of type j) when he fails to return
the collateral. Recall that he can only re-use a fraction νj of the asset pledged. We
assume that the non re-usable fraction 1 − νj can be deposited or segregated with a
collateral custodian.18 As a result, the lender may only abscond with the re-usable
fraction of the collateral. Absconding with the collateral is a default by the lender.19
In this event, the borrower gets back the 1 − νj units of segregated collateral and may
also claim any shortfall remaining after the cancellation of his obligation to repay f(s),
equal to max {p2(s)− f(s)− (1− νj)p2(s), 0} . Like in a borrower’s default, we assume
the borrower can only recover a fraction α of the claim and the lender incurs a non-
pecuniary cost equal to a fraction πj ∈ [0, 1] of the shortfall.
Hence, the lender prefers to return the non-segregated collateral rather than default
if and only if
νjp2(s) ≤ f(s) + (α + πj)max {νjp2(s)− f(s), 0} (5)
The left hand side of (5) is the benefit of defaulting given by the market value of the
re-usable collateral held by the lender.20 The expression on the right hand side is the cost
of defaulting which includes the foregone payment f(s) from the borrower, the fraction α
of the shortfall max {νjp2(s)− f(s), 0} recovered by the borrower, and the non-pecuniary
cost πj max {νjp2(s)− f(s), 0}. Observe that condition (5) can be rewritten as follows:
f(s) ≥ νjp2(s) (6)
18It is easy to understand why the lender segregates the non re-usable collateral. He would not derive
ownership benefits from keeping it on his balance sheet and segregation reduces his incentives to default.
In the tri-party repo market, BNY Mellon and JP Morgan provide these services. If segregation is not
available, incentives for the lender are clearly harder to sustain. This can be seen from equation (5) by
taking νj = 1. We will also see later that lenders need not segregate more collateral that the fraction
1 − νj . In Appendix B, where νj is instead the probability that lender j can access the market, the
choice of collateral segregation follows from a trade-off. More segregation strengthens the incentives of
the lender but also decreases the re-use rate of collateral.
19Standard Repo Master Agreements allow counterparties to distinguish between outright default by
the lender and “failure” to deliver the collateral on time. Late delivery of collateral is not necessarily
characterized as an event of default because finding the appropriate security to deliver might take time in
practice. We focus here on the first one, in which case the constraints imposed by the limited commitment
of the lender are more relevant.
20A lender might re-use the collateral and not have it on his balance sheet when he must return it to
the lender. However, observe that he can always purchase the relevant quantity of the asset in the spot
market to satisfy his obligation. When he returns the asset, the lender effectively covers a short position
−νj .
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that is, the lender prefers to return the collateral whenever the repurchase price f(s)
exceeds the value of the re-usable collateral he can abscond with.
No-Default Repos
The environment described extends the framework considered in standard models
of collateralized lending, as for instance Geanakoplos (1996), to allow for recourse loans.
When a borrower defaults, in addition to the loss of the collateral, he incurs pecuniary and
non-pecuniary costs. We assume these costs are sufficiently low and the non-pecuniary
cost is not too low compared to the recovery rate. Specifically, for every i:
πi + α < 1 (7)
α(u′(ω)− v′(ω)) ≤ πiv′(ω) (8)
Assumption (7) implies that a borrower always defaults if the loan is not collateralized.
In our environment unsecured borrowing is equivalent to a repo collateralized by an asset
with zero value. Under (7) the no-default condition for the borrower, (3), never holds
when p2(s) = 0. The second property, condition (8), then ensures that in equilibrium
investors prefer to trade default-free repo contracts. When the recovery rate α is posi-
tive, the recourse feature of loans in our environment implies that borrowers could make
higher payments to lenders with contracts inducing default.21 However, by doing so,
borrowers incur a non pecuniary penalty which is a deadweight loss. As we will show in
the proof of Proposition 1, under (8) such deadweight loss always outweighs the benefits
of increasing the income pledged through default. To summarize, investors will use the
asset as collateral to sustain borrowers’ incentives, and choose to trade securities that do
not induce default.
We can now define the set of repo contracts Fij that can be sold by investor i to
investor j so that no default occurs. This set depends on the period 2 spot market price
p2 = {p2(s)}s∈S . To simplify notation, we let θi := (α+πi)κ/(1− (α+πi)(1−κ)). From
conditions (4) and (6) we obtain:
Fij(p2) =
{
f | ∀ s ∈ [s, s̄] , νjp2(s) ≤ f(s) ≤ p2(s)
1− θi
}
(9)
21It is easy to verify that, for f large enough, the actual payment to the lender after a borrower
defaults, given by (1 − α(1 − κ))p2(s) + αf(s), exceeds the maximum amount a borrower can repay
without defaulting, given by the right hand side of (4).
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The upper bound of this set, p2(s)
1−θi , is the maximal amount that investor i can promise to
repay by selling one unit of a repo contract. It is increasing in θi, which we can interpret as
a measure of the creditworthiness or counterparty quality of investor i. Observe that the
set Fij(p2) is convex and that all contracts have the same collateral requirement given
our normalization. Hence, for any combination of multiple contracts sold by i, there
exists an equivalent trade of a single repo contract. We can thus focus our attention on
equilibria where at most one contract is sold by each agent and we use fij ∈ Fij(p2) to
denote the (unique) contract sold by investor i to investor j.
Investors’ optimization problem.
We can now write the optimization problem of an investor i. Let qij(fij) be the unit
price of contract fij.
22 The collection of these repo prices is qij = {qij(fij) | fij ∈ Fij(p2)}.
Given the spot prices and the prices of the repo contracts, investor i chooses which
contract to sell in Fij(p2), which contract to buy in Fji(p2), the volume of trade for
the two contracts as well as the trades of the asset in the spot market. Let b
ij
(resp.
lij) denote the amount sold (resp. bought) by investor i to investor j using the chosen
contract fij (resp. fji), that is the amount borrowed and lent. These contracts must be
such that investor i does not strictly benefit from trading any other existing contract at
the prices he faces. The quantities traded of the two contracts as well as the spot trades
must be a solution of the following problem:
max
ai1,a
i
2(s),b
ij ,lij
E
[
U i(ci1, c
i
2(s), c
i
3(s))
]
(10)
subject to ci1 = ω + p1(a
i
0 − ai1) + qij(fij)bij − qji(fji)lij (11)
ci2(s) = ω + p2(s)(a
i
1 − ai2(s))− fij(s)bij + fji(s)lij (12)
ci3(s) = a
i
2(s)s (13)
ai1 + νil
ij ≥ bij (14)
bij ≥ 0 (15)
lij ≥ 0 (16)
ai2(s) ≥ 0 (17)
22Even in the absence of default the price may depend on the identities of the agents trading the
contract, to the extent that investors may have different re-use abilities.
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Equation (11) is the budget constraint in period 1 for investor i, where the resources
available are ω + p1a
i
0. Equation (12) is the budget constraint in period 2 for every
realization of s, with the resources available given by the endowment ω, the value of the
investor’s asset holdings p2(s)a
i
1 and the net value of the repo positions fji(s)	
ij−fij(s)bij.
Equation (13) is the budget constraint in period 3. The collateral constraint of investor
i is specified in (14). When investor i sells contract fij (that is b
ij > 0), he must pledge
as collateral one unit of the asset per unit of repo contract sold. He can satisfy this
requirement either by acquiring the asset in the spot market (that is ai1 > 0), or in the
repo market (that is lij > 0). In the latter case however, only a fraction νi of the asset
purchased can be re-used.
It is important to observe that, when investor i buys but does not sell a repo contract
(that is lij > 0 and bij = 0), the collateral constraint may be satisfied with ai1 < 0
if νi > 0. Indeed, with re-use investor i can sell in the spot market an asset that he
acquired by purchasing a repo contract. When the repo matures, the investor would then
buy the asset to satisfy his obligation to return it to the repo seller, thus covering his
short position. Hence, equation (14) shows that a lender can use repo trades to take a
short position in the asset. However, investors cannot engage in naked short sales of the
asset.
We can now define a competitive equilibrium (in short a repo equilibrium) in the
environment described:
Definition.
A repo equilibrium is a system of spot prices p1, p2 = {p2(s)}s∈S , repo prices q12, q21,
a pair of repo contracts (f12, f21) ∈ F12(p2)×F21(p2) and an allocation {cit(s), ai1, ai2(s), 	ij, bij}
for i = 1, 2, j = i, t = 1, 2, 3 and s ∈ S such that
1. {cit(s), ai1, ai2(s), 	ij, bij}j =it=1..3,s∈S solves problem (10) with contracts (fij,fji), j = i ,
for investor i = 1, 2.
2. Spot markets clear: a11 + a
2
1 = a and a
1
2(s) + a
2
2(s) = a for any s. Repo markets
clear: bij = lji for i = 1, 2 and j = i.
3. For every other contract f̃ij ∈ Fij(p2)\ {fij} the price qij(f̃ij) is such that investors
i and j do not wish to trade this contract, for i = 1, 2 and j = i.
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The equilibrium selects the repo contracts that agents trade. Condition 3. ensures that
the market for other repo contracts clear with a zero level of trade.
3 Repo markets with re-use and the collateral mul-
tiplier
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium repo contracts and the resulting equilib-
rium allocation. We will show that investors 1 satisfy all their funding needs by selling
a repo contract and that lenders always want to re-use collateral. Various authors (see
for instance Singh and Aitken, 2010) have stressed the importance of collateral re-use for
repo transactions where the collateral is sold to the lender. Our model helps to precisely
characterize the benefits of re-use and its effects on repo contracts, in the presence of
limited commitment.
3.1 The collateral multiplier
We begin the analysis by showing that re-use gives rise to a collateral multiplier, which
we denote by M . By re-using collateral, investors 2 put back some assets in circulation,
that investors 1 can buy and use to back further loans. The process can then be iterated
over several rounds of trade. The existence of the collateral multiplier is similar to the
money multiplier in models with fractional reserve banking.
To determine the value of the multiplier we need to consider the sequence of trades
that may occur in period 1 with re-use. Let f(s) denote the payoff of the repo contract
that is traded in equilibrium. In the first round, investor 1 sells the asset in a repo to
some investor 2, against the promise to pay f(s) in state s in period 2. At the end of
the first round of trade, an investor 2 who purchased a unit of asset in a repo re-uses a
fraction ν2 by selling it spot. This amount is purchased by an investor 1 who then resells
it in a second repo. Observe that with this second repo, the additional payoff that an
investor 2 obtains in period 2 is equal to ν2 (f(s)− p2(s)): while investors 1 pledge an
additional ν2f(s) in each state s, investors 2 have to purchase ν2 units of the asset at
price p2(s) in order to make good on their promises to return the collateral.
Re-using ν2 units of the asset thus allows an investor 1 to pledge ν2 (f(s)− p2(s))
additional units in each state s of period 2. Whenever this amount is positive, re-using
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the collateral expands the ability to borrow of investors 1. Then, at the end of this second
round, an investor 2 has (ν2)
2 units of the asset which can again be re-used as above.
Iterating this process over infinitely many rounds, we obtain the amount that one unit of
asset allows investors 1, using repos with payoff f(s), to pledge in state s at date 2, net
of the price paid to repurchase the collateral in the spot market:
f(s) +
∞∑
r=1
(ν2)
r (f(s)− p2(s)) =
(
1
1− ν2
)
f(s)− ν2
1− ν2p2(s) (18)
The term 1/(1−ν2) is the “physical” multiplier that describes the increase in the amount
of collateral in circulation generated by the above sequence of trades. The second term is
the cost that must be paid to purchase the ν2/(1− ν2) units of the asset that are re-used.
Recall that p2(s)
1−θ1 is the maximal amount that investors 1 can promise to repay when
they sell one unit of an asset in a repo. Setting f(s) equal to this value in (18), we obtain
the borrowing capacity of investors 1 in state s, per unit of asset held, when lenders always
re-use the collateral received :(
1
1− ν2
)
p2(s)
1− θ1 −
ν2
1− ν2p2(s) =
1− θ1
1− ν2
[
1
1− θ1 − ν2
]
p2(s)
1− θ1 (19)
The collateral multiplier is the factor M that increases the maximum amount that can
be pledged with one unit of the asset, when there is re-use, that is
M ≡ 1− θ1
1− ν2
[
1
1− θ1 − ν2
]
(20)
We see that the multiplier is greater than 1 and strictly increasing in ν2 as long as θ1 > 0.
The fact that repos are recourse loans thus plays a crucial role to ensure that re-use
increases the borrowing capacity. If the only punishment for default were the loss of
collateral, re-use would have no effect.23
23In line with our result, Maurin (2017) proved in a more general setting that when loans are non
recourse, re-use is redundant unless the market for financial securities is incomplete.
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3.2 The equilibrium repo contract
We now derive the repo contracts traded in equilibrium. To do so, it is useful to begin
by determining the conditions under which the equilibrium allocation is the same as in
the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, that is, limited commitment constraints do not bind and
first best is attained. Intuitively, this can happen when the asset payoff is sufficiently
high that investors 1 can pledge enough income in period 2.
Recall that, at the first best allocation, investor 1 borrows in period 1 by promising
to repay ω − c12,∗ in period 2. Since each investor 1 has a units of collateral, in a repo
equilibrium with re-use the maximum income in state s at date 2 that can be pledged by
this investor is aMp2(s)/(1 − θ1). When in every state s this amount exceeds ω − c12,∗,
the first best is attained.
This is no longer possible when in some states the value of the collateral is so low that
this payment falls short of ω − c12,∗. In this case, in equilibrium investors 1 sell all the
asset they have in a repo, only one contract is traded in equilibrium and lenders always
re-use the collateral they receive. In the remainder of this section we simply refer to this
contract as f and to its price as q := q12(f). The sequence of trades described earlier pins
down investors 1’s holdings in period 1. Their spot position, a11 = a/(1− ν2) is the sum
of their initial holdings a10 = a and of the amount of collateral ν2a/(1 − ν2) re-used by
investors 2, that they buy in the spot market. Since investors 1 pledge all their asset in
repos, we have b12 = a/(1 − ν2). At the end of period 2, investors 1 end up holding all
the asset in equilibrium, that is a21 = a. Substituting these values into the expression of
the budget constraint (12), we obtain the value of their consumption in period 2:
c12(s) = ω + p2(s)(
a
1− v2 − a)− f(s)
a
1− v2 (21)
Note that in period 2, although they end up holding all the asset, investors 1 are net
sellers in the spot market. This is because investors 2 need to buy ν2a/(1− ν2) units to
cover the short positions they entered when re-using collateral.
For low realizations of p2(s), the borrowing constraint binds and the repurchase price
of the chosen contract equals the maximal amount that can be pledged by selling one
unit of the asset in a repo, p2(s)/(1− θ1). Substituting this value for f(s) into (21) yields
the equilibrium value of consumption in those states:
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c12(s) = ω − aMp2(s)/(1− θ1) (22)
In the other states, where the borrowing constraint does not bind, f(s) is set at the value
that ensures that the total payment made to investors 2, net of the cost of repurchasing
the collateral, equals ω − c12,∗, so that c12(s) = c12,∗.
The equilibrium spot price is then determined by investor 1’s first order condition:
p2(s) = s/v
′(c12(s)) (23)
This, together with (22), implies that p2(s) is strictly increasing in s. For any given value
of ν2, we denote then by s
∗(ν2) the lowest state for which the borrowing constraint does
not bind, obtained as a solution of the following equation:
c12,∗ = ω − aM
p2(s
∗(ν2))
1− θ1 = ω − aM
s∗(ν2)
(1− θ1)v′(c12,∗)
(24)
For all s ≥ s∗(ν2), equilibrium consumption equals the first best level (c12,∗, c22,∗), while for
s ≤ s∗(ν2), c12(s) is given by (22) and c22(s) = 2ω−c12(s). Observe that this threshold s∗(ν2)
is decreasing in a, θ1, and ν2. Hence, when the amount of asset, the creditworthiness of
investor 1 or the re-use capacity increases, the first best consumption level is attained in
more states.
Substituting the values obtained for c12(s) in equation (23) yields the following expres-
sion for the equilibrium spot price in period 2⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩p2(s)v
′
(
ω − aM p2(s)
1− θ1
)
= s if s < s∗(ν2)
p2(s)v
′(c12,∗) = s if s ≥ s∗(ν2)
(25)
We can now state our main result:
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Proposition 1. Equilibrium. Let ν1, ν2 ∈ [0, 1), θ1 > 0. If s∗(v2) > s, there is a
unique equilibrium allocation and a unique repo contract sold by investor 1 with payoff:
f(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
p2(s)
1− θ1 if s < s
∗(ν2)
p2(s
∗(ν2))
(1− θ1) + ν2(p2(s)− p2(s
∗(ν2))) if s ≥ s∗(ν2)
(26)
where p2(s) is defined in (25) and s
∗(ν2) in (24). Investors 2 re-use all the collateral
received by selling it spot. If s∗(ν2) ≤ s, or equivalently if ν2 ≥ ν∗ for some ν∗ < 1, the
first-best allocation is always attained in equilibrium.
Two main forces shape the characteristics of the equilibrium repo contract: investor
1’s desire to borrow in period 1 (the borrowing motive) and the aversion of both investors
to risk in their portfolio return in period 2 (the hedging motive). When the value of
the asset is low, for s ≤ s∗(v2), the repurchase price is equal to the maximal amount
investors 1 can promise to repay, thus exhausting their borrowing capacity. Hence, f(s)
is increasing in s and is only determined by investor 1’s borrowing motive because investors
are borrowing constrained.
On the other hand, when the collateral value is high, for s > s∗(v2), the borrowing
capacity of investor 1 exceeds his borrowing needs. Then, the repurchase price is set
at a level that allows investors to perfectly hedge the price risk affecting the value of
their portfolio in those states. In high states, the hedging motive thus pins down the
repurchase price. Note that the repo contract provides hedging against the asset price
in two ways. First, while the maximum income pledgeable in a repo sale varies with
p2(s), the first term in the expression of f(s) in the last line of (26) is constant and
equal to the pledgeable income in state s∗(v2). Second, the repurchase price offsets the
price exposure of investor 2 who must cover the short position she entered when re-using
collateral. To unwind her position, she must buy the asset back, which exposes her to
price risk. Thanks to the term ν2 [p2(s)− p2(s∗(ν2))] in (26), the repurchase price offsets
the cost of unwinding the short positions when s > s∗(ν2).
Altogether, both the borrowing motive and the hedging motive generate variability
of the repurchase price. The blue curve in Figure 1 plots the repurchase price of the
equilibrium repo contract when v(x) = δx, for δ ∈ (0, 1).
By construction, the repo contract specified in (26) is such that borrowers never
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f(s)
s s∗
s∗(ν2)
δ(1−θ1)
s̄
−
+
s/δ
s
δ(1−θ1)
ν2
Figure 1: Repo contract (v(x) = δx).
want to default. With re-use however, we must also verify that the lenders’ incentives
are satisfied and that they are willing to comply with their promise to return the asset
pledged as collateral. It is immediate to see that the payoff of the repo contract f(s) is
always higher than the value of the re-usable fraction of the collateral ν2p2(s) investor
2 can abscond with. Hence lenders never want to default with this contract since their
no-default constraint (6) is satisfied for any value of ν2.
As we already noticed, the higher is ν2, the higher the collateral multiplier M and
hence the borrowing capacity of investors 1. The final claim in the proposition states
that, when the re-usable fraction of the collateral is sufficiently high (ν2 ≥ ν∗), the first-
best level of consumption can be attained even in the lowest state s. One can obtain the
expression for ν∗ simply by setting s∗(ν2) = s in equation (24):
ν∗ =
s∗(0)− s
s∗(0)− (1− θ1)s.
In this case, several repo contracts or a combination of repo and spot trades can support
the equilibrium allocation. In contrast, when collateral is scarce or ν2 sufficiently low
that s*(ν2) ≥ s, there is a unique equilibrium repo contract and investor 1 sells all his
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asset using this repo.
As we also show in the proof of Proposition 1, when investors trade the repo contract
f they do not want to trade other repo contracts and there is no other equilibrium where
a different contract is traded.
Finally, and for completeness notice that the repo rate r is determined as follows:
1 + r =
E[f(s)]
q
. (27)
Since borrowers are constrained and u′(c22(s)) > u
′(c22,∗) this rate is lower than in the first
best allocation: 1 + r < 1 + r∗.
3.3 Haircuts and liquidity premium
In this section, we derive the properties of the liquidity premium and the haircut in the
repo equilibrium. We define the liquidity premium L as the difference between the spot
price p1 of the asset in period 1 and the spot price p̂1 of another (virtual) asset that cannot
be used as collateral but has the same payoff. The liquidity premium thus captures the
value of the asset over and above its holding value when this asset facilitates borrowing.
It is equal to the shadow price of the collateral constraint and we can also refer to it as
the collateral premium. Using the equilibrium characterization and the investors’ first
order conditions, we can show24 that the liquidity premium is given by:
L = 1
1− ν2E[(f(s)− p2(s))(u
′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))] (28)
The expression for the liquidity premium has an intuitive interpretation. Observe first
that it is positive only if investors are constrained, that is when u′(c22(s)) > v
′(c12(s)) for
some states. This arises when s < s∗(v2). The term f(s)−p2(s) is the additional amount
investor 1 can pledge when using the asset as collateral rather than in a spot trade in the
states where investors are constrained. Finally, the liquidity premium is proportional to
the physical multiplier 1/(1 − ν2) since a unit of the asset pledged as collateral can be
re-used in further trades.
24In the repo equilibrium with re-use, the collateral constraint binds both for lenders and borrowers.
Still, since u′(c22(s)) ≥ v′(c12(s)) for all s, the value of p̂1 is always determined by investor 2’s marginal
utility. Hence the collateral constraint reflects the shadow price of the constraint for this investor.
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The repo haircut is the difference between the spot price and the repo price of the
asset in period 1. One unit of the asset can be bought in the spot market at price p1 and
sold at the equilibrium repo price q. So to purchase 1 unit of the asset, an investor needs
p1 − q, which is the down payment or haircut:25
H ≡ p1 − q = E[(p2(s)− f(s))v′(c12(s))] (29)
The second equality in (29) follows from the first order condition of investor 1 with respect
to spot and repo trades. As Figure 1 shows, the borrowing and hedging motives have
opposite effects on the size of the haircut. In the region s < s∗(v2), where investor 1
is constrained, the repurchase price is equal to p2(s)/(1 − θ1) while the asset trades at
price p2(s). From expression (29) we see that these low states thus contribute negatively
to the haircut. On the other hand, when s ≥ s∗(v2) the difference p2(s) − f(s) is first
negative and then positive for s sufficiently large. When this happens, the difference
contributes positively to the haircut. These two cases correspond respectively to the
regions with horizontal and vertical lines in Figure 1. The overall sign of the haircut
depends on the probability mass attributed to the two regions by the distribution of s.
Finally, observe that the haircut is not uniquely pinned down when investors are not
borrowing constrained (s∗(ν2) ≤ s) since as we already noticed, several repo contracts
support the first best equilibrium allocation.
With re-use, investor 1 finds it profitable to buy the asset spot in order to re-use it in a
repo. These trades increase investor 1’s income in period 1 by−p1+q = −H, that is minus
the haircut. When H < 0, these transactions relax investor 1’s borrowing constraint to
capture some of the unexploited gains from trade. It may thus seem that buying spot
to sell in a repo is not desirable when H > 0 since in that case the period 1 income of
investor 1 decreases. But this line of argument ignores the gains from transferring income
across states in period 2. In state s in period 2, the corresponding income generated from
these trades for investor 1 is p2(s) − f(s) which is the value of the asset minus the
repurchase price. This gain is negative for low values of s but from expression (29) we
see that, when H > 0, it must be positive for s above some threshold. In words, these
trades allow investor 1 to reduce his income in the low states where his marginal utility
for consumption is low (and the one of investor 2 is high) while increasing his income
25An alternative but analogous definition states the haircut in percentage terms: (p1 − q)/q.
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in the high states. Therefore, re-use with H > 0 allows investor 1 to smooth (albeit
imperfectly) his consumption across states in period 2. The benefit of this additional
smoothing effect in period 2 compensates the cost of the reduction in investor 1’s income
in period 1. Proposition 1 indeed shows that when s∗(ν2) > s lenders always want to
re-use the collateral they are pledged, and this is true independently of the sign of the
haircut. Finally, our model predicts that the benefits of re-use are larger when collateral
is most scarce and there is evidence that this is indeed the case (see Fuhrer, Guggenheim,
and Schumacher, 2016).
3.3.1 Collateral scarcity and counterparty quality
In this section we study the impact of collateral scarcity, counterparty quality, and re-use
on the level of the liquidity premium and the haircut.
Proposition 2. L is decreasing and H is increasing in the amount of collateral a. H
decreases in counterparty quality θ1 while the effect of θ1 on L is ambiguous. The effect
of ν2 on H and L is ambiguous.
When a increases, more asset can be sold in a repo. Note that s∗(v2) declines when a
increases. Hence there are fewer states where s < s∗(v2), and in those states the wedge in
marginal utilities u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s)) is reduced. As more gains from trade are realized,
the shadow price of the collateral constraint, that is L, goes down. This result is standard
in models where investors are borrowing constrained and use an asset as collateral or as a
mean of payment.26 The decline in s∗(v2) when a increases also implies that the haircut
decreases since there are less states where the repurchase price is equal to the maximal
income that can be pledged in a repo sale, which contributes negatively to the haircut as
we saw in Figure 1.
We now discuss the comparative statics effects related to the more novel features of
our model, counterparty quality and re-use. As argued above, increasing counterparty
quality and re-use (through an increase in ν2) expands the borrowing capacity, like an
increase in a. However, Proposition 2 shows that the overall effect of increasing either θ1
or ν2 on the haircut and liquidity premium are different from that of an increase in a.
26See Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) for the canonical model of endogenously incomplete markets with
collateral and Lagos (2010) for a monetary environment where the asset facilitates decentralized trades.
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Figure 2: Influence of counterparty quality, with θ′1 > θ1 (v(x) = δx)
A higher counterparty quality θ1 decreases haircuts since the maximal pledgeable
income p2(s)/(1− θ1) increases. Intuitively, a better counterparty has a higher ability to
honor debt, which reduces the required down payment. Figure 2 illustrates the effect
of an increase in counterparty quality to θ′1 > θ1, with the new repo contract depicted
in red. The solid line from the origin representing the maximal income that can be
pledged rotates counterclockwise, as this income increases when θ1 increases. We see the
value of the repurchase price is also higher in the states s ≥ s∗(ν2) where investor 1 is
unconstrained. Both these changes lead to a decrease of the haircut, as shown by the
dotted area in Figure 2.
With regard to the liquidity premium L, counterparty quality θ1 has instead an am-
biguous effect. Indeed, raising θ1 improves the borrowing capacity of investors 1 in states
s < s∗(ν2). This reduces the wedge u′(c22(s)) − v′(c12(s)) and lowers s∗(ν2).27 This effect
is similar to the one we found for an increase in the outstanding amount of the asset,
27Observe that θ1 also affects the spot market price p2(s) in period 2 for s ≤ s∗(ν2). Hence, to
assess the effect of θ1 on the borrowing capacity aMp2(s)/(1 − θ1), one must also consider this effect.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the equation p2(s)v
′(ω − aMp2(s)/(1 − θ1)) − s = 0 we see
that ∂[Mp2(s)/(1− θ1)]/∂θ1 > 0, that is the overall effect of θ1 on the borrowing capacity is positive.
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and tends to reduce the liquidity premium. However, there is a second effect: since the
pledgeable income is higher in the states s < s∗(ν2) where this is most valuable for in-
vestors 1, the asset becomes a better borrowing instrument, which raises its price and so
its liquidity premium.
Consider now the effects of re-use on the liquidity premium and the haircut. First,
the amount of the asset than can be pledged as collateral increases with ν2, through the
collateral multiplier. This relaxes the investors’ borrowing constraint and hence tends to
decrease the liquidity premium and to increase the haircut, an effect similar to that of an
increase in the asset quantity a. However, collateral re-use affects these variables through
other channels. When ν2 increases, every unit of the asset becomes more valuable since
investors can re-use a higher fraction of it, which tends to increase the liquidity premium.
Hence, the overall effect of re-use on the liquidity premium is ambiguous. To see why
re-use also has an ambiguous effect on the haircut, it is useful to consider Figure 1. An
increase in ν2 lowers the threshold s
∗(ν2) since investors are less constrained. We see from
the figure that this tends to decrease the repurchase price and thus to increase the haircut.
However, an increase in ν2 also increases the slope of the equilibrium repo contract for
s ≥ s∗(ν2) because of the hedging motive, thereby decreasing the haircut. Finally, we
observe that the effect of re-use on leverage is also ambiguous. We define leverage as the
amount of debt that borrowers raise per dollar of the asset, that is q/p1. Hence leverage
is negatively related to the spot price p1 of the asset and positively related to the repo
price q. The ambiguity of the general equilibrium effects of re-use on these prices thus
extends to the effect of re-use on leverage.
3.3.2 Asset risk
We can use our model to compare haircuts and liquidity premia for assets with different
risk profiles. To this end, we extend the environment by introducing a second asset. For
simplicity, we assume that the second asset has a perfectly correlated payoff with the first
asset but carries higher risk. Hence, there is no possibility of hedging positions in one
asset with an opposite position in the other asset. Therefore the pattern of equilibrium
trades as well as the properties of repo contracts are determined by the same principles
as before.
The second asset pays a mean preserving spread of the dividend of the first asset
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dividend,
ρ(s) = s+ σ(s− E[s]),
where σ > 0. Investor 1 is still endowed with a units of the first asset and also owns b
units of the second asset, while investor 2 is not endowed with any of the assets. The
set of available contracts consists of all feasible repos using any of the two assets. It is
relatively straightforward to extend the equilibrium analysis of Section 3.2 to this new
environment. For each asset, the repurchase price of the equilibrium repo contract is
equal to the maximal income that can be pledged selling one unit of that asset in a repo
in all states where the first best level of consumption cannot be reached and includes the
correction to hedge the price risk otherwise. We then establish the following result.
Proposition 3. The safer asset always has a higher liquidity premium and a lower haircut
than the riskier asset.
The key intuition behind the result is that the mean preserving spread of the dividend
induces a misallocation of collateral value across states. While the two assets have the
same expected payoff E[s], the riskier asset pays relatively more in high states (where
there is upside risk) and less in low states (downside risk). An asset is particularly
valuable as collateral in low states where investor 1 is borrowing constrained. Since the
safer asset pays more in these states, it carries a larger liquidity premium. Turning now
to the haircut, the riskier asset has a higher dividend in high states, which ensures a
higher borrowing capacity in these states compared to the safer asset. However, investor
1 does not benefit by borrowing more in those states where he attains the first best level
of consumption. Thus, since a smaller fraction of the asset dividend is pledged in the
equilibrium repo for the second asset, the haircut is larger.28
Our results are in line with the empirical evidence that safer assets command lower
repo haircuts (see e.g. Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Through this repo collateral channel,
our model also rationalizes the findings by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
and others that safe assets command a (higher) liquidity premium. While investors can
sell and pledge both safe and risky assets in our model, the safer assets are more useful
as collateral and thus bear a higher premium. Also note that in our model, the same
28Note that with risk-neutral preferences, there is no hedging motive and the repurchase price is always
equal to the maximum pledgeable income. Equation (29) then shows that the haircut would not depend
on asset risk.
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stochastic discount factors are used to price the assets in equilibrium since investors can
trade both assets at the same time. An advantage of our approach is that the comparison
effectively controls for market conditions and its implications can be brought to the data
in a more meaningful way.29
The next section shows that re-use may lead to endogenous intermediation in equi-
librium.
4 Collateral Re-use and Intermediation
In practice, cash is intermediated among market participants through chains of repos.30
For example, as Figure 3 illustrates, a hedge fund borrows cash through a repo from
a dealer bank who finances this transaction by tapping a cash pool, say an insurance
company, via another repo. This is surprising because platforms such as Direct RepoTM
in the US grant hedge funds direct access to cash pools. So why do traders resort to repo
intermediation? In this section we show that these chains of repos may arise in equilib-
rium. A remarkable feature of our analysis is that intermediation arises endogenously:
although the hedge fund is free to trade directly with the insurance company, he still
prefers to trade instead with a dealer bank. We explain this feature with differences in
counterparty quality for the hedge fund and the dealer bank.31
In this section we extend the economy introducing a third type of investor labeled B,
for dealer Banks. Investor B is endowed with no asset and ω units of the consumption
good in periods 1 and 2 and has the following preferences:
UB(c1, c2, c3) = c1 + δBc2 + c3
29For completeness, we also considered the effect of changing the risk of the asset in a single asset
economy. The equilibrium allocation is different for various level of risk, and we find that a mean
preserving spread implies a higher haircut while the effect on the liquidity premium is indeterminate and
depends on risk aversion.
30In their guide to the repo market, Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin (2015) state that “dealers
operate as intermediaries between those who lend cash collateralized by securities, and those who seek
funding”.
31In practice, the transaction between the dealer bank and the insurance company could take place
using a Tri-Party agent as a custodian. We abstract from modeling the services provided by the Tri-Party
agent. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010) for a discussion of this segment of the repo market.
We thus focus on the intermediation provided by the dealer bank to the hedge fund and the insurance
company.
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Figure 3: Intermediation with Repo
For simplicity, as a special case of our general specification, we assume here that investor
1 has linear preferences too, that is v(x) = δx or:
U1(c1, c2,c3) = c1 + δc2 + c3
We posit δ ≤ δB < u′(ω). This implies that investor B would also like to borrow from
investor 2 in the first period but has no asset to use as collateral, and has weakly lower
gains from trade than investor 1. We assume θB > θ1 so investor B is more creditworthy
than investor 1. His greater borrowing capacity will explain why investor B can play a role
as an intermediary. All investors are free to participate in the spot market and engage in
repo trades with any type of counterparty. We will say that there is intermediation when
investor 1 sells his asset to B and B re-sells it to investor 2. We show that intermediation
indeed arises in equilibrium. It may take place via a spot or a repo sale from investor
1 to B depending on the relative values of δ and δB. Thus our notion of intermediation
encompasses more than just chains of repos and we derive below the conditions for each
pattern of intermediation to arise. In what follows, it is useful to refer sometimes to
agent 1 as the natural borrower, to agent 2 as the natural lender, and to agent B as the
intermediary.
4.1 Intermediation via spot trades
We assume first that the natural borrower and the intermediary have the same prefer-
ences, that is δ = δB and only differ in their creditworthiness. We show that in equilibrium
intermediation takes place via a spot sale from 1 to B. Note that in this case, there are
no direct gains from trade between 1 and B. Hence, the trades between these investors
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are only driven by the intermediation role played by B.
Proposition 4. Intermediation Equilibrium. Let δ = δB and θ1 < θB. When
s∗(ν2) > s (the first best allocation cannot be achieved in the equilibrium with re-use of
Proposition 1), in equilibrium, investor 1 sells his asset spot to investor B, who then
re-sells it in a repo to investor 2.
Since it is very similar to the proof of Proposition 5 below, we relegate the proof of
this Proposition to Online Appendix D.3. The striking feature in Proposition 4 is that
investor 1, who is endowed with the asset, no longer sells it in a repo contract to investor
2, the natural lender. Instead, in equilibrium, investor 1 sells the asset spot to B. Once
investor B gains possession of the asset, he finds himself in the same position as investor
1 in the last section vis a vis investor 2. He then engages in an infinite sequence of repo
sales and spot purchases of the re-usable collateral with 2. The equilibrium repo contract
fB2 is specified as in (26), replacing θ1 with θB.
If investor B were not present, we saw in the previous sections that investor 1 would
borrow in a repo from investor 2. However, since θB > θ1, investor B can borrow more
than 1 from investor 2 for each unit of the asset. Thus investor B values the asset more
and bids up the spot market price. As a result, investor 1 prefers to sell his asset in the
spot market, as if he were delegating borrowing to a more creditworthy investor.
Intermediation takes place via a spot sale from investors 1 to B and not via a repo
sale. To understand this, observe that, since 1 and B have the same preferences, they
cannot benefit from a redistribution of income among them between periods 1 and 2.
With a repo, investor 1 would in fact be able to obtain from B more income to be spent
in period 1 as compared to a spot sale. However, investor 1’s benefit equals what he must
pay to B for the transfer. In addition, trading a repo entails a cost because a fraction
1 − νB of every unit of the asset transferred to B could not be used to borrow from 2.
Hence, investor B would pay a lower price to acquire the asset through a repo purchase,
which implies the preference for a spot transaction.
Finally, investor B could be inactive in equilibrium if investor 1 is endowed with a
sufficiently high quantity of the asset (that is, s∗(ν2) < s). In the case, investor 1 can
attain the first best allocation by trading directly with investor 2 in spite of his lower
creditworthiness. An interesting implication of our result is thus that intermediation
should be more important precisely when collateral is scarce.
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4.2 Chain of repos
We show next that when δ < δB intermediation may occur via a chain of repos. We
call intermediation equilibrium with a chain of repos an equilibrium where the following
pattern of trades is observed: investor 1 sells the asset in a repo to investor B, who re-uses
the asset to sell it in a repo to an investor 2. Since δ < δB, there are now direct gains
from trade between 1 and B. However, since δB < u
′(ω), these gains are still smaller than
those between 1 and 2. Hence, trades between 1 and B must still be at least partially
driven by the intermediation role of B.
It is useful to compare first the chain of repos with alternative patterns of trades. This
discussion will shed some light on the conditions stated in the repo chain equilibrium of
Proposition 5. When δ < δB a redistribution of income from period 2 to period 1 in
favor of investor 1 is beneficial. It follows from the discussion in the previous section
that investor 1 could capture these benefits by using a repo, instead of a spot sale, at the
cost of immobilizing collateral. Thus a trade-off emerges now. For investors 1 and B to
prefer a repo sale over a spot sale, the direct gains from trade between 1 and B, given by
δB−δ, must be sufficiently large relative to the fraction of collateral segregated 1−νB. At
the same time, the direct gains from trade between B and 2 must be sufficiently large for
B to be willing to re-use the asset he acquires from 1 in a repo trade with 2. Otherwise,
he will use all the asset in trades with investor 1. This imposes an upper bound on δB−δ.
Finally observe that, unlike with a spot sale from investor 1 to B, intermediation with
a repo chain involves collateral segregation. Hence, intermediation is preferred to direct
trade between investors 1 and 2 if the difference in counterparty quality θB − θ1 between
B and 1 offsets the cost of segregation 1− νB.
Investor 2’s ability to re-use collateral does not affect qualitatively any of the trade-
offs described above so for clarity we set ν2 = 0 in what follows.
32 We can now state the
exact conditions under which a chain of repo arises in equilibrium.
32In Online Appendix D.4, we show that an analogous result holds when ν2 is positive but sufficiently
smaller than νB .
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Proposition 5. Chain of Repos. Let ν2 = 0. There exists δ̄B > δB > δ such that the
equilibrium features intermediation with a chain of repos if and only if δB ∈ [δB, δ̄B] and
νB
1− θB ≥
1
1− θ1 (30)
Investors 1 sells all the asset in a repo f1B to B with
f1B(s) =
s
1− θ1 ∀s ∈ [s, s̄] (31)
Investor B sells part of the asset in a repo fB2 to 2 with
fB2(s) =
⎧⎨⎩
p2(s)
1−θB if s < s
∗
B2
p2(s∗B2)
1−θB if s ≥ s∗B2
for some s∗B2 ∈ [s, s̄] and the remaining part in a spot sale to investor 1.
The lower bound δB on δB ensures investor 1 prefers to sell the asset in a repo rather
than spot to investor B. The upper bound δ̄B ensures that the direct gains from trade
between investors B and 2 are sufficiently large that B prefers to re-use part of the asset
to trade with 2. We actually show that, in equilibrium, investor B must be indifferent
at the margin between re-selling collateral spot to investor 1 and selling it in a repo to
investor 2. For instance, suppose to the contrary that investor B strictly prefers to re-
pledge the collateral to investor 2. Then we show that, at the margin, investors 1 and B
would rather engage in a spot trade than in a repo. Intuitively, a marginal switch from a
repo sale to a spot sale from 1 to B is beneficial since it frees up some of the segregated
collateral, allowing B to borrow more from 2.
Condition (30) ensures that intermediation dominates direct trade between investors
1 and 2. It states that 1
1−θ1 , the borrowing capacity of investor 1 per unit of asset, is
lower than νB
1−θB , the borrowing capacity of investor B with one unit of asset acquired in
a repo. Since only a fraction νB can be re-used by investor B, his higher creditworthiness
must compensate for the cost of segregation.
Finally, observe that the repo contract f1B between investors 1 and B does not reflect
any hedging motive since both investors are risk neutral. For investors B and 2, the repo
contract is instead essentially the same as in Proposition 1 with ν2 = 0.
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To sum up, intermediation via a chain of repos will arise in equilibrium if a third
party is more creditworthy than the natural borrower and more efficient at re-deploying
collateral than the natural lender. Our analysis thus shows that repo intermediation arises
endogenously out of fundamental heterogeneity between traders. Existing models of repo
intermediation typically take the chain of possible trades as exogenous. Our approach
is helpful to rationalize several features of the repo market. First, we can explain why
intermediating repos is still popular despite the emergence of direct trading platforms.
Second, in exogenous intermediation models, dealers typically gain and collect fees by
charging higher haircuts to borrowers. In our model, the haircut paid by the borrower to
the bank may very well be smaller than the one paid by the bank to the lender. Using
data from the Australian repo market, Issa and Jarnecic (2016) show that this is indeed
the case in most transactions.
5 Implementation
Ou model captures some key features of the repo contracts traded in financial markets,
namely the sale of the collateral which allows lenders to re-use the asset and the recourse
nature of the loan. However, the equilibrium contract derived in Section 3 does not
exactly correspond to repos traded in practice because the repurchase price varies with
the future price p2(s) of the collateral. In a typical repo, the seller commits to repurchase
the asset at a fixed price. In fact, market participants quote the fixed interest rate of the
repo, which implicitly defines a constant repurchase price. In this section, we propose
a two-step implementation of the equilibrium contract in Proposition 1. First, we show
that it can be exactly implemented with a combination of a debt-like contract and a
hedging contract. Next, we show that the debt-like contract payoff is very similar to that
of fixed repo with default in equilibrium.
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5.1 Exact Implementation
We first propose an implementation of the equilibrium contract in Proposition 1 with a
combination of the two following contracts
d(s) =
⎧⎨⎩
p2(s)
1−θ1 if s ≤ s∗(ν2)
p2(s∗(ν2))
1−θ1 if s > s
∗(ν2)
, h(s) = ν2 max {p2(s)− p2(s∗(ν2)), 0} (32)
Essentially, the original contract f is split into two contracts d and h. The first contract
d is similar to a collateralized debt contract with a fixed repayment in high states and a
state contingent payment equal to the maximal pledgeable income in low states. Hence,
contract d provides the fixed payoff unless the collateral value is too low. The second
contract h is a hedging contract against an increase in the price of the collateral above
p2(s
∗(ν2)). Contract h compensates for the price risk faced by the lender who re-uses
collateral.
Suppose that both contracts are sold by investor 1 to investor 2 and backed by the
same unit of collateral. By construction, the combination of these two contracts has the
same promised payoff as the original contract in Proposition 1. Because the collateral
requirement is the same and the punishment for default is linear in the payoffs, neither
the borrower defaults, nor the lender fails on contracts d and h. Hence, the combination
of the debt-like contract d and the hedging contract h exactly implements the original
contract.
5.2 Fixed repurchase price
We now establish the connection between the debt-like contract d and a repo with a
constant repurchase price and default in equilibrium. Consider the repo with repurchase
price
f̄ =
p2(s
∗(ν2))
1− θ1
This fixed promised payoff of contract f̄ is the payoff the debt contract d promises only
in states s ≥ s∗(ν2). When s ≤ s∗(ν2), the promised payoff f̄ exceeds the maximal
pledgeable income p2(s)/(1 − θ1) and hence the borrower defaults. When the borrower
defaults, the lender liquidates the collateral and recovers a fraction α of the shortfall for
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a total payment of p2(s) + α(f̄ − (1 − κ)p2(s)), as shown by equation (3). This payoff
is represented by the upward-sloping solid line on Figure 4. Observe that although it is
also increasing in p2(s), this payoff is different from the payoff of the debt-like contract
d, equal to p2(s)/(1 − θ1), represented by the dashed line since there are default costs.
These default costs also explain the wedge between the lender’s payoff and the cost paid
by the borrower in these states. This cost is equal to p2(s) + (α + π1)(f̄ − (1− κ)p2(s))
since the borrower loses the collateral and incurs costs proportional to the shortfall. This
total cost to the borrower is represented by the dashed and dotted line on Figure 4. The
wedge between the lender’s payoff and the borrower’s cost reflects the deadweight loss
from the asset liquidation and the non-pecuniary punishment.
Hence, for s < s∗(ν2), the implementation of the equilibrium contract with a repo
with a constant repurchase price is only approximate. Still, our argument highlights the
feature that limited commitment by the borrower implies default in the low states, thus
reducing the payoff of the lender, which becomes state-contingent. With a repo with a
constant repurchase price, state contingency arises as a consequence of default. Instead,
the debt contract d embeds this state contingency in the contract design ex-ante.33
6 Conclusion
We analyzed a simple model of repurchase agreements with limited commitment and
price risk. Unlike a combination of a sale and future repurchase in the spot market, a
repo contract provides insurance against price fluctuations. Due to the recourse nature
of repos as well as the ability to re-use collateral, repos expand the borrowing capacity
of investors through a collateral multiplier effect. We showed that the repo haircut is an
increasing function of counterparty risk and of the asset inherent risk. Safe assets also
command a higher liquidity premium than risky ones. We model repos as recourse loans
and allow investors to re-use collateral, thus capturing the distinctive aspects of repos
from standard collateralized loans. In addition, our model can explain intermediation
whereby creditworthy investors borrow on behalf of riskier counterparties.
33In a previous version of the paper, we analyzed the model when investors could only trade contracts
with non-state contingent repayment terms. We showed that under some conditions, investors were
willing to trade fixed repo contracts that induced default and that gains from re-using collateral were
still present.
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p2(s∗(ν2))
1−θ1
f̄
p2(s∗)
1−θ1
Figure 4: Repo contract with fixed repayment f̄
Solid line: lender’s payoff. Dashed and dotted line: borrower’s cost. Default threshold: s∗(ν2).
Our simple model delivers rich implications about the repo market but leaves many
venues for future research. We argued that counterparty risk is a fundamental determi-
nant of the terms of trade in repo contracts. In Europe, over the past few years, bilateral
repo transactions between banks moved increasingly to the centrally cleared segment of
the market (see Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2015). In this case, clearing im-
plies novation of trades by the central counterparties. Novation bears some similarities
with intermediation although terms of trades cannot be adjusted and risk may end up
being concentrated on a single agent. We believe our model could be extended to account
for this evolution. When it comes to re-use, besides the limit on the amount of collateral
that can be re-deployed, we assumed a frictionless process. Traders establish and settle
positions smoothly although many rounds of re-use may be involved. Although we did
not investigate this aspect in the present work, we believe that in the presence of fric-
tions such as bilateral trading, collateral re-use may contribute to market fragility. This
extension would complement the recent literature, such as Biais, Heider, and Hoerova
(2018), who have shown the negative impact of spot market fire sales on secured lending
markets.
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Appendix A: Default procedure in Master Agreements
This Appendix describes the default procedure as stated in paragraph 10 of the General
Master Repo Agreement (GMRA) of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Asso-
ciation (SIFMA) and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). The GMRA,
governed by English law is the most widely used Agreement. According to Baklanova,
Copeland, and McCaughrin (2015), most U.S. repo dealers would rather use SIFMA’s
Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA), governed by New York state law, for domestic
U.S. counterparties but the provisions for default stated in paragraph 11 of the MRA are
essentially the same as those in the GRMA.
The default procedure is initiated by one of the parties sending a default notice to the
other party, after an event of default occurred. Events of default include, for example,
the borrower failing to repay the lender at the agreed date, the lender failing to deliver
equivalent securities on the repurchase date, either party failing to transfer margins when
margins are due, or either party being in a general state of insolvency with respect to
other obligations triggering bankruptcy.
Within 20 days following an event of default, if the event is continuing, the non-
defaulting party may specify an Early Termination Date (ETD) for all outstanding obli-
gations pertaining to the contract. These obligations and their values are determined by
the non-defaulting party. The latter has to present a statement to the defaulting party
detailing the amount due under each obligation, as soon as reasonably practicable. The
amounts due in relation to the repo contract are netted against each other. The party
with a positive balance is liable to pay the other party the day after the statement is
provided and interests shall apply between the ETD and the effective payment date fol-
lowing usual market conventions. A delay between the ETD and the statement date may
occur, for instance, as the non-defaulting counterparty needs to value the collateral and
possibly other securities used as margins in the transaction, as explained below.
To determine the market value of the securities used in the repo, the non-defaulting
party can34 (1) choose the realized price when (s)he has traded these securities on or
34According to the ICMA’s summary of the Master Agreement, this value should be a measure of the
securities’ fair market value, calculated using whatever pricing sources and methods the non-defaulting
party deems appropriate in his reasonable opinion. Sources can include, without limitation, securities
with similar maturities, terms and credit characteristics. In effect, the calculation of the Net Value is
marking-to-model (calculating a theoretical fundamental price).
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about the early termination date, (2) use the arithmetic means of price quotes by two or
more market dealers, (3) determine a value for the securities whenever s(he) deems it not
reasonable to trade the securities at the quotes provided by the market dealers, e.g. if the
securities are illiquid. In any of these scenarios all reasonable transaction costs, realized
or expected, related to the purchase or sale of these securities (including commissions,
fees, any mark-up, mark-down or premium paid for guaranteed delivery) can be deducted
from the securities’ value to obtain the default market value of the securities.
The defaulting party shall also be liable for the amount of all reasonable legal and
other professional expenses incurred by the non-defaulting party in connection with, or
as a consequence of, an event of default. In addition, the non-defaulting party can claim
any loss or expense s(he) incurred in replacing transactions or in hedging its exposure
in connection with the termination of the repo contract. However, no party may claim
any amount related to consequential losses or damages due to an event of default. The
default market value of the securities and the other expenses specified above play a key
role in the determination of the balance due.
Note that the GMRA distinguishes between an outright default by the lender and a
settlement fail whereby the borrower expects the lender to return the collateral but with
some delay. The latter event is not often treated as an event of default (see paragraph
10(a)(ii)), because delay may result from internal miscommunication on the type of secu-
rities to be transferred, or genuine difficulties for the lender to find these securities (see
Fleming and Garbade, 2005). Still, settlement fails disrupt the functioning of the repo
market and the Treasury Market Practices Group (TPMG) introduced a fails charge for
U.S. Treasuries in 2009, while the European Union is planning on introducing similar
penalties.
Finally, while it is not explicitly stated in the GMRA it is worth pointing out that,
in case a party is insolvent, any unsecured claim resulting from the procedure described
above will be treated as a junior claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Appendix B: Repos without collateral segregation.
In the model, the lender segregates a fraction 1 − ν2 of the collateral. This is optimal
because he is only able re-trade a fraction ν2 of the asset. In most repos however, no
collateral is segregated. This means that lenders can potentially re-use all the asset
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although they do not always exert this right. A small modification to our setup allows us
to rationalize this observation. Assume that the lender can only re-trade with probability
ν2. Instead of being deterministic, the ability to re-trade collateral is now stochastic.
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This small difference between the two models has important implications for incentives
and collateral segregation. Suppose indeed that investors want to achieve a re-use rate of
collateral of ν2. With a deterministic access to the spot market, lenders only need to be
able to re-use a fraction ν2 of the asset and can segregate the remaining fraction 1− ν2.
With a probabilistic access, borrowers must now grant full re-use rights of collateral,
which means that the lender does not segregate any asset. With full re-use rights, the
lender is more likely to default since he can abscond with all the collateral. The no-default
constraint indeed writes
f(s) ≥ p2(s) (33)
This condition is tighter than the no-default constraint (6) in our baseline model where
the re-usable fraction is ν2.
In the model with probabilistic access to the spot market, a trade-off thus arises
between collateral re-use and the incentives of the lender. Observe indeed that (6) may
be violated by the equilibrium contract in Proposition 1. Investors may then consider
segregating a fraction ξ > 0 of the collateral. This relaxes the no-default constraint of
the lender (33), that becomes f(s) ≥ (1 − ξ)p2(s). However, segregating collateral also
reduces the re-use rate which falls to ν2(1 − ε). This trade-off is moot in the baseline
model since then, the no-default constraint of the lender does not bind when investors
only segregate the collateral that cannot be re-used.
Under some simple condition though, the equilibrium allocation of the probabilistic
model is the same than in the main text. It can only be the case if investors segregate no
collateral since otherwise the re-use rate would be strictly lower than ν2. We are left to
derive the condition under which the no-default constraint (33) holds for the equilibrium
contract in Proposition 1. The condition is tighter in the highest state s̄ where it writes
p2(s
∗(ν2))
1− θ1 + ν2(p2(s̄)− p2(s
∗(ν2)) ≥ p2(s̄)
35To preserve the tractability of the new model, one could assume that each investor is made of a
continuum of small traders who face idosyncratic access shocks to the spot market. By, the law of
large number, investor would be able on average to re-use at most a fraction ν2 of collateral without
segregation.
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It can be shown that this condition simplifies to
c22,∗ − ω > a
s̄
v′(c12,∗)
(34)
Condition (34) states that the net promised payoff (the left hand side) exceeds the total
value of the collateral pledged in the highest state s̄ (the right hand side). If (34) is
satisfied, the equilibrium is then identical except that collateral needs not be segregated.
Appendix C: Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We show here that a competitive equilibrium exists where investor 1 only sells one con-
tract, does not sell the asset spot, and investor 2 does not sell a repo contract to investor
1. The proof has several steps. In step 1, we derive the first order conditions for the
individual problem (10). In step 2, we determine the conditions under which investors do
not wish to trade other repos. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium repo con-
tract and the spot market price in period 2 (Step 3). We finish the proof with a series of
claims that we prove in Online Appendix D.2. Claim 3 states that investors do not trade
other repo contracts. Claim 4 establishes that, when condition (8) holds, investors do not
trade repos inducing default. Finally, Claim 5 states that the equilibrium allocation is
unique. To streamline the presentation, we also relegate the proof of some intermediate
results to the Online Appendix.
Step 1: First order conditions for the individual choice problem (10).
Let γi1 denote the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral constraint (14) in problem (10),
for investor i = 1, 2. The variable γi2(s) denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the no short
sale constraint (17) in period 2 and state s for investor i = 1, 2. As we wrote in the main
text, it is convenient here to simply write f for the contract f12 sold in equilibrium by
investor 1 to 2 and q = q12(f) for its price. The first order conditions of problem (10)
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with respect to ai1, a
i
2(s) for i = 1, 2 and b
12, l21 are:
−p1 + E[p2(s)v′(c12(s))] + γ11 = 0, (C.1)
q − E [f(s)v′(c12(s))]− γ11 = 0, (C.2)
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ γ21 = 0, (C.3)
−q + E [f(s)u′(c22(s))]+ ν2γ21 = 0, (C.4)
−p2(s)v′(c12(s)) + γ12(s) + s = 0, (C.5)
−p2(s)u′(c22(s)) + γ22(s) + βs = 0. (C.6)
We will verify that investor 2 does not sell a repo contract to investor 1. Hence the first
order conditions with respect to l12, b21 for a contract f21 ∈ F21(p2) are not reported
above.
Step 2: Conditions on the equilibrium contract f
We determine then the conditions f must satisfy to ensure investors do not trade
other repo contracts. Consider an arbitrary repo contract f̃12 ∈ F12(p2) different from f .
For f to be the only traded contract, the price q12(f̃12) must be such that investor 1 does
not wish to sell f̃12 and investor 2 does not wish to buy it. Observe that investor 1 prefers
not to sell f̃12 as long as its price is lower than E
[
f̃12(s)v
′(c12(s))
]
+ γ11 , where we used
the marginal rate of substitution of investor 1, evaluated at the equilibrium allocation,
to determine his marginal willingness to sell f̃12. Similarly, investor 2 prefers not to buy
this contract if the price is higher than E
[
f̃12(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ ν2γ
2
1 . Hence, it is possible to
find a price q12(f̃12) such that there is no trade in equilibrium of repo contract f̃12 iff the
following condition holds:
E
[
f̃12(s)v
′(c12(s))
]
+ γ11 ≥ E
[
f̃12(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ ν2γ
2
1 (C.7)
The above inequality can be rewritten, using equations (C.2) -(C.4) above to substitute
for γ11 and γ
2
1 , as:
E
[(
f(s)− f̃12(s)
) (
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)] ≥ 0 (C.8)
which must hold for all f̃12 ∈ F12(p2). Similarly there is no trade for repo contract
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f̃21 ∈ F21(p2) sold by investor 2 to investor 1 if:
E
[
f̃21(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ γ21 ≥ E
[
f̃21(s)v
′(c12(s))
]
+ ν1γ
1
1 (C.9)
Substituting for γ21 and γ
1
1 using equations (C.2)-(C.4), the condition becomes:
E
[
f̃21(s)
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)] ≥ ν1
1− ν2E
[
(f12(s)− ν2p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)]
− 1
1− ν2E
[
(f12(s)− p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)]
(C.10)
Step 3: Equilibrium contract f and spot market price p2
We first prove that if (C.8) and (C.10) hold, then we must have u′(c22(s)) ≥ v′(c12(s))
for all s of any subset of [s, s̄] of positive measure.36 This means that investor 1 never
over-borrows in period 1. Suppose this were not the case on a subset S0 of [s, s̄]. To
establish a contradiction we need to consider two cases.
Suppose first there exists a subset S1 ⊆ S0 of positive measure such that ε1 :=
mins∈S1 f(s) > 0. Consider a repo contract with payoff f̃12(s) = f(s)− ε1 for s ∈ S1 and
f̃12(s) = f(s) otherwise. Condition (C.8) for such contract is clearly incompatible with
u′(c22(.)) < v
′(c12(.)) on S0.
If no such subset exists, this implies that f = 0 almost surely on S0. Using investor
1 budget constraint (12) in period 2 and states s ∈ S0 with f = 0, we obtain:
c12(s) = ω + p2(s)(a
1
1 − a12(s)) ≥ ω + p2(s)(a− a12(s)) = ω + p2(s)a22(s) (C.11)
The inequality follows from the claimed property that investor 1 does not sell the asset in
the spot market in period 1 and thus that a11 ≥ a10 = a. To derive the third equality, we
used the spot market clearing condition in period 2. The investors’ short sale constraint
(17) in period 2 implies that a22(s) ≥ 0. Hence, c12(s) ≥ ω for all s ∈ S0, which together
with the assumption that u′(ω) > v′(ω) implies that u′(c22(s)) > v
′(c12(s)). This again
contradicts the claim u′(c12(s)) < v
′(c22(s)) for all s ∈ S0.
We next show that investor 2 does not hold the asset after period 2, that is a22(s) = 0.
36All similar assertions in this proof require the qualification “on any subset of [s, s̄] of positive mea-
sure”, though we sometimes omit the statement in what follows.
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Using equations (C.5)-(C.6), we have
γ22(s) = γ
1
2(s) + p2(s)
[
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
]
+ (1− β)s (C.12)
Since β < 1, the Lagrange multiplier γ12(s) is non negative and u
′(c22(s)) ≥ v′(c12(s)), it
follows that γ22(s) > 0 in any state s. Since γ
2
2(s) is the Lagrange multiplier on the no
short sale constraint (17) of agent 2 in period 2 and state s, we have that a22(s) = 0. By
market clearing, a12(s) = a
1
1− a22(s) ≥ a since a11 ≥ a because investor 1 is assumed not to
sell the asset spot in period 1 and hence γ12(s) = 0. Using the budget constraint (12) of
investor 1 in period 2, state s and the property that investors do not trade spot in period
2, we get:
c12(s) = ω − b12f(s) + (a11 − a12(s))p2(s) = ω − b12f(s) + (a11 − a)p2(s) (C.13)
Plugging this expression in equation (C.5), we obtain:
∀s, p2(s)v′(ω − b12f(s) + (a11 − a)p2(s)) = s (C.14)
We now distinguish the cases where the collateral constraint does not bind from the case
where it binds. In the first case, the following claim holds, for which we relegate the proof
to the Online ppendix.
Claim 1. If γ11 = 0, investors reach the first best-allocation. We have that s
∗(ν2) ≤ s.
The spot market price at date 1 is given by p1 = E[s]. Finally, there exists ν
∗ such that
the first-best allocation is attained if ν2 ≥ ν∗ where
ν∗ =
s∗(0)− s
s∗(0)− (1− θ1)s (C.15)
We can now focus on the case where the collateral constraint binds, that is γ11 > 0.
This means that b12 = a11. Suppose there exists a subset S0 of [s, s̄] where u′(c22(s)) >
v′(c12(s)) for s ∈ S0. If not, the analysis in the proof of Claim (1) would appliy and the
first-best allocation would be attained in all states. Then for (C.8) to hold, for s ∈ S0,
f(s) must take the maximum possible value in F12(p2), that is f(s) = p2(s)/(1 − θ1).
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Then, using equations (C.1)-(C.4), we have
γ21 =
1
1− ν2E
[
(f(s)− p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)]
(C.16)
This proves that γ21 > 0 since either u
′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s)) = 0 or u′(c22(s)) > v′(c12(s)) and
f(s) > p2(s) for s ∈ S0 The collateral constraint of investor 2, equation (14) binds, that
is
ν2b
12 + a21 = 0, ν2b
12 = a11 − a (C.17)
Using our previous result that b12 = a11, we find that a
1
1 = b
12 = a/(1 − ν2). Hence,
substituting for b12 and a11 in equation (C.14), we obtain:
c12(s) = ω −
a
1− ν2 (f(s)− ν2p2(s)) (C.18)
In the states s ∈ S0, using that f(s) = p2(s)/(1− θ1), we can rewrite equation (C.14) to
obtain equation (23). This proves that p2(s) is strictly increasing in s. In addition, since
u′(c22(s)) > v
′(c12(s)) by definition of c
1
2,∗ we have c
1
2(s) = ω − aM p2(s)1−θ1 > c12,∗.
On the other hand, if for some states s∈[s, s̄] the inequality u′(c22(s)) ≥ v′(c12(s)) holds
as an equality, we have c12 = c
1
2,∗. This is compatible with (C.18) if and only if
f(s) = ν2p2(s) +
1− ν2
a
(ω − c12,∗) =
p2(s
∗(ν2))
1− θ1 + ν2(p2(s)− p2(s
∗(ν2)) (C.19)
where to obtain the second inequality, we used the definition of s∗(ν2). The spot price in
period 2 is given by p2(s)v
′(c12,∗) = s.
We then show that there exists a threshold ŝ such that c12(s) > c
1
2,∗ for s < ŝ and
c12(s) = c
1
2,∗ for s ≥ ŝ and that this threshold is equal to s∗(ν2).
Claim 2. In equilibrium, we have that c12(s) > c
1
2,∗ for s < s
∗(ν2) and c12(s) = c
1
2,∗ for
s ≥ s∗(ν2).
Collecting our previous results, we have show that f is given by equation (26) and
the spot market price p2 is given by (25). The first order conditions with respect to spot
trades in period 1 hold with
p1 = E[p2(s)v
′(c12(s)] + γ
1
1 = E[s] +
1
1− ν2E[(f(s)− ν2p2(s))(u
′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))]
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We finish the proof with a series of claims that we prove in Online Appendix D.2.
Claim 3. Investors do not engage in other repo trades.
In Claim 3, we verify that investor 1 does not use another repo contract to sell the
asset and that investor 2 re-uses the asset through a spot sale rather than a repo sale.
Claim 4. Investor 1 does not sell a repo contract inducing default when condition (8)
holds.
In the proof of Claim 4, we show that investor 1 never sells a contract leading him to
default in some states. Under condition (8), the non-pecuniary cost offsets the benefits
from pledging more income through the recourse component of the loan.
Claim 5. The equilibrium allocation is unique and the pattern of trades is also unique
when s∗(ν2) ≥ s.
In the proof of Claim 5, we show that there the pattern of trades we consider comes
without loss of generality to prove that the equilibrium is unique. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 1.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We first the derive the expression for the liquidity multiplier. The price p̂1 of a (virtual)
asset without collateral value is equal to the highest valuation for that asset among
investors 1 and 2. We have
p̂1 = max
{
E[p2(s)v
′(c12(s)),E[p2(s)u
′(c22(s))]
}
= E[p2(s)u
′(c22(s))] (C.20)
where the second equality follows from the result that u′(c22(s)) ≥ v′(c12(s)) for all s, that
we proved in Proposition 1. We thus obtain
L = p1 − p̂1 = E[p2(s)u′(c22(s))] + γ21 − E[p2(s)u′(c22(s))]
=
1
1− ν2E[(f(s)− p2(s))(u
′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))]
=
θ1
(1− ν2)(1− θ1)
∫ s∗(ν2)
s
(
p2(s)u
′(c22(s))− s
)
dG(s) (C.21)
The second line justifies expression (28) in the main text. To obtain the third line, we
replaced f(s) by its equilibrium value and we used equation (C.5). Differentiating L with
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respect to a, we obtain:
∂L
∂a
=
θ1
(1− ν2)(1− θ1)
∫ s∗(ν2)
s
[
∂p2(s)
∂a
u′(c22(s)) +
∂[ap2(s)]
∂a
Mp2(s)
1− θ1 u
′′(c22(s))
]
dG(s)
(C.22)
where we used the relationship c22(s) = 2ω− c12(s) and equation (22) for the expression of
c12(s). Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (25), we obtain that
∂p2(s)
∂a
≤ 0
and ∂[ap2(s)]
∂a
> 0. Since u is strictly concave, this proves that ∂L
∂a
< 0.
Turning then to the haircut, using the equilibrium expression for the repo contract f
and the consumption of investor 1 in period 2, we obtain:
H = p1 − q = E[(p2(s)− f(s))v′(c12(s))]
= −
∫ s∗(ν2)
s
θ1
1− θ1 sdG(s) + (1− ν2)
∫ s̄
s∗(ν2)
(
s− s
∗(0)
1− θ1
)
dG(s) (C.23)
where, to derive the final expression, we substituted for f(s) thanks to (26), we used
equation (C.5) and the definition of s∗(ν2) to introduce s∗(0). Observe that H only
depends on a through s∗(0). Hence:
∂H
∂a
= − 1
1− θ1
∂s∗(0)
∂a
[1−G(s∗(ν2))] (C.24)
This expression is positive because, from equation (24), s∗(0) is decreasing in a. The
effect of counterparty quality θ1 is negative since:
∂H
∂θ1
= − 1
(1− θ1)2
[∫ s∗(ν2)
s
sdG(s) + s∗(0)[1−G(s∗(ν2))]
]
< 0 (C.25)
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In the proof, we refer to the first asset as asset A and to the second asset as asset B, with
dividend, respectively ρA(s) = s and ρB(s) = s+ σ(s−E[s]). The repo equilibrium with
two assets is similar to the one asset case. Investor 1 sells his holdings of asset i = A,B in
a repo f i. Let s∗∗(ν2) be the minimal state where the first best allocation can be reached,
defined by:
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ω +M
aρA(s∗∗(ν2)) + bρB(s∗∗(ν2))
(1− θ1)v′(c12,∗)
= c22,∗. (C.26)
The repurchase price for the equilibrium repo on asset i ∈ {A,B} is:
f i(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
pi2(s)
1− θ1 if s ≤ s
∗∗(ν2)
pi2(s
∗∗(ν2))
(1− θ1) + ν2(p
i
2(s)− pi2(s∗∗(ν2)) if s > s∗∗(ν2)
(C.27)
where pi2 is the spot market price of asset i = A,B in period 2, given by:⎧⎨⎩p
i
2(s)v
′
(
ω −M apB2 (s)+bpB2 (s)
(1−θ1)
)
− ρi(s) = 0 s ≤ s∗∗(ν2)
pi2(s)v
′(c12,∗) = ρ
i(s) s > s∗∗(ν2)
(C.28)
Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 2, the liquidity premium for asset
i = A,B is then
Li = θ1
(1− ν2)(1− θ1)
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
ρi(s)
[
u′ (c22(s))
v′(c12(s))
− 1
]
dG(s) (C.29)
Let us define l(s) := u′ (c22(s)) /v
′(c12(s)) − 1 and denote k = (1 − ν2)(1 − θ1)/θ1. We
obtain:
LA − LB = 1
k
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
(s− ρB(s))l(s)dG(s) = −σ
k
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
(s− E[s])l(s)dG(s) (C.30)
We need to show that the integral in the expression above has a negative sign. Note
that l(s) is strictly decreasing in s on [s, s∗∗(ν2)]. This follows from the fact that c22(s) =
ω + aM p2(s)
1−θ1 and p2(s) is increasing in s, so that c
2
2(s) is increasing in s and c
1
2(s) is
decreasing in s, while u′ and v′ are decreasing since u and v are concave functions. This
implies that, for all s, [l(s)− l(E[s])][s− E(s)] ≤ 0. We thus obtain∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
(s− E[s])l(s)dG(s) ≤ l(E[s])
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
(s− E[s])dG(s)
Since
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
(s−E[s])dG(s) is negative for any value of s∗∗(ν2) ∈ [s, s̄], the expression on
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the right hand side of the inequality above is negative and so LA −LB > 0, which proves
our claim.
The haircut for the equilibrium repo on asset i = A,B can be obtained proceeding
along similar lines to the argument in the proof of Proposition 2:
Hi = E[s]−
∫ s∗∗(ν2)
s
ρi(s)
1− θ1dF (s)−
∫ s̄
s∗∗(ν2)
[
ρi(s∗∗(ν2))
1− θ1 + ν2(ρ
i(s)− ρi(s∗∗(ν2))
]
dF (s)
(C.31)
Hence, we obtain:
HB −HA = σ
1− θ1
∫ s̄
s∗∗(ν2)
(s− s∗∗(ν2))dF (s)− ν2σ
∫ s̄
s∗∗(ν2)
(s− s∗∗(ν2))dF (s) > 0
where we used
∫ s̄
s
(s − E[s])dF (s) = 0 to obtain the expression on the right hand side.
The safer asset A always commands a lower haircut than the risky asset. The inequality
is strict if s∗∗(ν2) > s, that is investor 1 is borrowing constrained.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
We show in what follows that there exists an equilibrium where investors 1 sell all their
asset in a repo f1B to investor B, who in turn re-uses the asset acquired as collateral
to sell it partly spot (to some investor 1) and partly in a repo fB2 to investors 2. The
first order condition for investor 1 spot trade in period 1 is given by (C.1) while that
with respect to the repo trade of contract fB1 is given by (C.32) below. The first order
conditions of investor B with respect to spot trades and repo trades of contract fB1 and
fB2 are then given by equations (C.33)-(C.35) below, and those of investor 2 with respect
to spot trades and repo trades of contract fB2 are given, respectively, by (C.5) with ν2 = 0
and (C.36):
q1B − δE[f1B(s)]− γ11 = 0 (C.32)
−p1 + δBE[p2(s)] + γB1 = 0 (C.33)
−q1B + δBE[f1B(s)] + νBγB1 = 0 (C.34)
qB2 − δBE [fB2(s)]− γB1 = 0 (C.35)
−qB2 + E
[
fB2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
= 0 (C.36)
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By an argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that only
investor 1, who has the greatest marginal utility for consumption in period 3, carries the
asset into period 3. Since v(x) = δx here, we obtain p2(s) = s/δ.
Step 1: Equilibrium Repo Contracts
It follows from the analysis in Proposition 1 and the fact that investors 1 and B are
both risk neutral, that the repo contract f1B sold by investor 1 to B must be given by:
f1B(s) =
p2(s)
1− θ1 , ∀s. (C.37)
We now characterize the repo contract fB2 sold by investor B to investor 2. From
equations (C.32) to (C.34), we obtain
γB1 =
δB − δ
1− νBE[f1B(s)− p2(s)], γ
1
1 = γ
B
1 + (δB − δ)E[p2(s)] (C.38)
Hence, since f1B(s) > p2(s) for all s, we get γ
B
1 > 0 and thus γ
1
1 > 0. This implies that
the collateral constraints of both investors 1 and B bind or:
a11 = b
1B, aB1 + νBb
1B = bB2 (C.39)
The first equation states that investor 1 sells in a repo the amount of asset he is endowed
plus what he buys in the spot market. The second equation states that investor B re-uses
all the collateral acquired in the repo with investor 1, that is νBb
1B, both to sell it in the
spot market (since aB1 < 0 in the claimed equilibrium) and to sell it in a repo to investor
2. By spot market clearing in period 1 we have a = a11+a
B
1 +a
2
1 and, since in the claimed
equilibrium investor 2 does not trade spot, that is a21 = 0, we obtain:
a = (1− νB)b1B + bB2 (C.40)
From equation (C.40) it follows that the possible values of bB2 compatible with equilibrium
are [0, νBa]. The highest possible value is obtained by setting b
1B = a and corresponds to
the situation where investor B does not re-sell spot any of the re-usable collateral bought
in repo f1B so that investor 1 may only sell repo his endowment a
1
0 = a. For any given
value of bB2, the pattern of trades between investors B and 2 is given as in Proposition
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1 with ν2 = 0. Hence, the equilibrium repo contract fB2 sold by B to 2 is:
fB2(b
B2, s) =
⎧⎨⎩
p2(s)
1−θB if s < s
∗(bB2)
p2(s∗(bB2))
1−θB if s ≥ s∗(bB2)
where s∗(bB2) is defined by an expression analogous to (24):
c22,∗ = ω + b
B2p2(s
∗(bB2))
1− θB = ω + b
B2 s
∗(bB2)
δ(1− θB)
For s ≥ s∗(bB2), investor 2 consumption in period 2 equals the first best level c22,∗.
Step 2: Re-use of collateral
We now determine the quantity bB2 sold in the repo by investor B to investor 2.
This will also pin down the amount b1B sold in the repo by investor 1 to investor B via
equation (C.40). From equations (C.37) and (C.38), we obtain
γB1 =
(δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1)E[p2(s)] (C.41)
while from (C.35) and (C.36) we get:
γB1 =
∫ s∗B2(bB2)
s
[
u′
(
c22(b
B2, s)
)− δB] p2(s)
1− θB dG(s) (C.42)
where c22(b
B2, s) = ω + bB2fB2(b
B2, s). Substituting (C.41) above for γB1 in (C.42) yields:∫ s∗B2(bB2)
s
[
u′
(
c22(b
B2, s)
)− δB] p2(s)
1− θB dG(s) =
(δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1)E[p2(s)] (C.43)
This relationship proves the property stated below Proposition 5 that investor B is in-
different between re-using the collateral to sell it in a repo to investor 2 (the left hand
side) or to sell it spot to investor 1 (the right hand side). Since∫ s∗B2(b)
s
[
u′
(
c22(b, s)
)− δB] p2(s)dG(s)
is strictly decreasing in b, there is at most one value of bB2 satisfying equation (C.43).
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To establish the claimed property of the equilibrium, we have to prove that the solution
lies in the feasible range for bB2, which we showed is [0, νBa]. The condition that b
B2 ≥ 0
yields
u′(ω)− δB
1− θB ≥
(δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1) (C.44)
or equivalently
δB ≤ δ̄B :=
θ1
(1−νB)(1−θ1)δ +
u′(ω)
1−θB
θ1
(1−νB)(1−θ1) +
1
1−θB
(C.45)
Observe in particular that δ̄B ≤ u(ω). The condition bB2 ≤ vBa is equivalent to:
∫ s∗B2(νBa)
s
u′
(
ω + νBa
s
δ(1−θB)
)
− δB
1− θB sdF (s) ≤
(δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1) (C.46)
or
δ ≥ δB :=
θ1
(1−νB)(1−θ1)δ +
∫ s∗B2(νBa)
s
u′
(
ω+νBa
s
δ(1−θB)
)
1−θB sdF (s)
θ1
(1−νB)(1−θ1) +
∫ s∗B2(νBa)
s
1
1−θB sdF (s)
(C.47)
with δB ≥ δ. Since δB ≤ δ̄B and δB ≥ δB are respectively equivalent to (C.44) and
(C.46), it is easy to see from these expressions that δB ≤ δ̄B
Step 3: No other profitable trades
We are left to show that investors do not wish to engage in other trades. The argument
in the proof of Proposition 1 still applies to show that investor 2 does not wish to sell a
repo to any other investor and that investor B does not sell a repo to 1. Hence, we are
left to verify that investor 1 does not wish to bypass investor B. In other words, there
should be no repo contract that investor 1 desires to sell to investor 2. Hence, for any
f̃12 ∈ F12(p2) the following inequality must hold:
δE[f̃12(s)] + γ
1
1 ≥ E
[
f̃12(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
(C.48)
Using equations (C.1) to (C.36) to substitute for γ11 , we obtain:
E
[(
f̃12(s)− p2(s)
) (
u′(c22(s))− δ
)] ≤ E [(fB2(s)− p2(s)) (u′(c22(s))− δB)] (C.49)
This inequality holds for all f̃12 ∈ F12(p2) if it holds for the highest value of the payoff
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in F12(p2), p2(s)1−θ1 . Substituting this value into the inequality above and rearranging terms
we obtain:
0 ≤ E
[(
fB2(s)− p2(s)
1− θ1
)(
u′(c22(s))− δB
)]− E [(f12(s)− p2(s)) (δB − δ)]
⇔ 0 ≤
[
1
1− θB −
1
1− θ1
] s∗B2(bB2)∫
s
[
u′
(
c22(b
B2, s)
)− δB] p2(s)dG(s)− θ1(δB − δ)
1− θ1 E[p2(s)]
⇔ 0 ≤
[
1− 1− θB
1− θ1
]
γB1 − γB1 (1− νB)
⇔ 0 ≤ νB
1− θB −
1
1− θ1
where the last inequality is condition (30).
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